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I. INTRODUCTION
What does it mean for a university to "seriously consider" race-neutral
alternatives? Does it require, for instance, on-the-record review,1
documentation of underlying facts,2 or demonstration of an empirical basis3 for
a decision?4 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's affirmative action jurisprudence
requires post-secondary institutions to address these questions, yet does little to
answer them. By requiring universities to conduct "serious, good-faith
consideration of workable race-neutral altematives ' 5 before engaging in non-
remedial race-conscious activities-but without specifying the requisite nature
and scope of this "consideration"-Justice O'Connor has left many institutions
to wonder what is needed to satisfy the Court.
1. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 973-76
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that a race-neutral proposal submitted to the board was "never formally
discussed at the board meeting"), aff'd 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev 'd and remanded by 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. ARTHUR L. COLEMAN & SCOTT R. PALMER, COLL. BD., ADMISSIONS AND DIVERSITY
AFTER MICHIGAN: THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 53 (2006)
(recommending that higher education institutions adopt the practice of documenting and
recording "[t]he entire array of race-neutral practices pursued by the institution").
3. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AFTER ADARAND xi
(2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/080505_fedprocadarand.pdf.
4. These practices were discussed in a Bush Administration report that was briefly posted
on the website of the U.S. Department of Education but not formally published or distributed. It
is referenced in the Civil Rights Commission's Federal Procurement After Adarand, which is still
accessible. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES: DIVERSITY
STRATEGIES FOR PRIVATE COLLEGES, REPORT No.3, RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVE SERIES 1 1-
12 (2005) [hereinafter INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES], as summarized in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi, 18, 21, 23-24, 74, 84.
5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
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Surprisingly little analysis has been given to this central element of narrow
tailoring,6 which Justice O'Connor developed in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.7 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,8 before applying it to
universities in Gratz v. Bollinger9 and Grutter v. Bollinger.I0  As Justice
O'Connor noted, numerous universities are experimenting with a "wide variety
of alternative approaches" to using race-conscious admissions.' 1
Commentators have explored various approaches, including class-rank plans,• • •12
socioeconomic preferences, and lottery assignment plans. What courts and
commentators have largely failed to explore, however, is the basic
methodological question: What, specifically, does it mean to give serious
consideration to these alternatives?
Justice O'Connor's decisions only complicate the question by dictating the
requirement in strong terms but applying it so liberally as to sanction even
perfunctory performance. While Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion "does not
require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative," it does
require "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives. ' 3  At the same time, the Court approved the University of
Michigan Law School's race-conscious admission system, which was
predicated on weak or nonexistent consideration of race-neutral alternatives.
14
The inconsistency arises from the Court's failure to provide clear standards to
guide judicial decision-making and institutional compliance. In other words,
the same doctrinal vagueness that has prevented the Court from rendering its
decision in clear and consistent terms may also impede universities from
complying with the law. Until the Court finally provides standards to guide
6. On the paucity of earlier analysis, see ARTHUR L. COLEMAN ET AL., COLL. BD., RACE-
NEUTRAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO ACTION 3 (2008) [hereinafter COLEMAN ET
AL., RACE-NEUTRAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION] (commenting that "few topics have generated as
much heat and as little light as 'race-neutral alternatives"' and observing that "critical legal and
policy issues . ..have been missing in action"), and Michael E. Rosman, Race-Conscious
Admissions in Academia and Race-Neutral Alternatives, I NEXUS 66, 70 (1996) ("[T]he Courts
have not explained in great detail the extent to which a state actor must consider or employ race-
neutral alternatives.").
7. 488 U.S. 469, 506-07 (1989).
8. 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
9. 539 U.S. 244, 266 (2003).
10. 539 U.S. at 326-27, 342.
11. Id. at 342.
12. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-
NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (2004), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/edlite-raceneutralreport2.html [hereinafter ACHIEVING DIVERSITY]; see also COLEMAN &
PALMER, supra note 2, at 50-53 (discussing socioeconomic status and lottery systems and
attendant case law).
13. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
14. On the Law School's failure to consider such alternatives, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 137
F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2001), for the district court's description of the University of
Michigan Law School's review system.
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
future consideration, the result can only be legal uncertainty, compliance
failures, and increased litigation.
Universities, in the meantime, have received little or no judicial guidance as
to the requirements for race-neutral alternatives, and, as a result, appear to be
floundering. Some institutions may be rigorously evaluating race-neutral
alternatives as part of their ongoing programmatic review. If so, they are not
providing any degree of public transparency. 5 Perhaps this is due to concerns
that disclosure would increase their risk of litigation or federal administrative
investigation, exacerbate political divisions within the institution, or place the
institution in an unflattering public light. Others, however, are apparently not
complying with the "serious consideration" requirement at all.
16
Academia's failure to comply with this constitutional mandate may be
understandable, because even cabinet-level federal agencies have been
similarly remiss. The federal government's noncompliance with the "serious
consideration" requirement was the subject of a 2005 report by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights.17  This agency noncompliance, however, is
particularly ironic in light of longstanding Justice Department guidance, s as
well as more recent guidance from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and
the U.S. Department of Education.' 9 These standards have been disregarded
by many federal agencies in part because the courts have not explicitly held
them to any specific standards of serious consideration.
This issue should not, however, be as difficult for universities or the courts
as it appears to be. Educational administrators are generally familiar with what
it means to seriously evaluate educational programs. Educational program
15. In several states, public universities have been precluded from employing racial
preferences. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (result of California referendum); Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932, 934-36 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding University of Texas Law School's race-based
admission program unconstitutional); Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov, 9, 1999) (gubernatorial
policy). These universities have not only seriously considered, but also implemented, race-
neutral diversity measures. See Curt A. Levey, Troubled Waters Ahead for Race-Based
Admissions, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 63, 96-97 (2004). What is less clear is the extent to which all
other federally financed public and private post-secondary institutions are seriously considering
race-neutrality before resorting to, or continuing with, the use of race as a factor in admissions,
financial aid, or other benefits. Some prominent higher education attorneys have maintained in
conversations with the authors that their clients are rigorously evaluating the feasibility of race-
neutral programming but that these institutions prefer to avoid public disclosure of their
evaluative activities.
16. See Rachel Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher
Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 231 (2006) (noting that "[d]espite federal efforts to promote
[race-neutral] alternatives, colleges have not paid as much attention to this [legal requirement]").
17. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at iii.
18. Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 171 (1995) [hereinafter DOJ Guidance
Memorandum].
19. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi (stating that the U.S.
Department of Education recommends six standardized practices to determine if a program is
race-neutral).
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evaluation is a well-developed field with established methodologies and
standards. This Article argues that basic principles of program evaluation
provide clear standards and criteria for serious program consideration, and that
application of these methodologies is mandated by the Court's decisions. Part
II describes the manner in which Justice O'Connor constitutionalized program
evaluation standards for diversity initiatives. Part III assesses extra-judicial
guidance about this requirement, including regulatory guidance by federal
administrative agencies, demonstrating that detailed standards are now
available to guide the serious consideration of race-neutral programs. Part IV
examines the way in which race-neutral alternatives may be measured and
argues that the Court's recent jurisprudence permits the use of race-conscious
measures to evaluate race-neutral programs, but that these measures must be
connected to multi-factored diversity indicia. Part V assesses the program
evaluation literature to examine the requirements of "serious" evaluation under
contemporary professional and academic standards. As litigation will
increasingly focus on narrow tailoring, administrators' failure to apply proper
program analysis to race-neutral alternatives could jeopardize many diversity
programs. Moreover, the absence of requisite program analysis of race-neutral
alternatives will lead to uncertainty, confusion, and disregard for the law.
Thus, this Article supplies a framework for identifying meaningful program
evaluation standards that can enable universities to comply with the
requirements set forth in Justice O'Connor's affirmative action jurisprudence.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RACE-NEUTRAL
ALTERNATIVES REQUIREMENT
The idea that narrow tailoring requires a serious consideration of race-
neutral alternatives emerges out of Justice Lewis Powell's plurality opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. Relying as much upon scholarly
literature as upon the Court's precedents, Justice Powell asserted that in
affirmative action cases, courts should intensely scrutinize the means with
which government agencies pursue race-conscious goals to ensure that less
intrusive means are not available.2 1 Justice O'Connor amplified this standard
by requiring that government agencies themselves seriously consider race-
neutral alternatives before resorting to race-conscious measures.
22
A. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
The Wygant Court held, in a fractured set of opinions, that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a school board from
extending race-preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employees
based on their race or national origin when less intrusive options, such as
20. See 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 & n.7 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at n.6.
22. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
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hiring goals, are available.23  As Justice Powell observed, the Court had
previously required judicial evaluation to ensure that programs employing
racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish race-conscious purposes are narrowly
tailored to achieve their legitimate goals.
24
Justice Powell added a significant element to the requirement, noting that the
term "narrowly tailored" had acquired an additional, secondary meaning in the
academic literature.25  Specifically, Justice Powell imported from a few
scholarly articles a new legal standard that "require[s] consideration of whether
lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. 2 6  In
particular, he cited with approval Professor Kent Greenawalt's assertion that
"[courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a nonracial
approach or a more narrowly-tailored racial classification could promote the
substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense."
27
Justice Powell emphasized that the Court's focus is on the means by which the
28government pursues even goals of great importance. Justice Powell again
relied on commentators to support his notion that "no matter what the weight
29of the asserted governmental purpose," the means must be narrowly tailored.
Justice Powell observed that these scholars had contended that courts should
scrutinize not only the ends but the means by which race-conscious
government programs are advanced.3 ° Indeed, in the case of legislation,
"judicial scrutiny of legislative means [may be] more appropriate than
[scrutiny] of the legislative purpose. 31
23. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84 (opinion of Powell, J.) (plurality opinion). Interestingly, it
was Justice Thurgood Marshall, in dissent, who suggested that the layoffs could have been
handled through a lottery system. Id. at 310 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall dispensed
with this alternative, however, on the ground that it would have disrupted the school's seniority
hierarchy. Id.
24. Id. at 279-80 (opinion of Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 280 n.6.
26. Id.
27. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign"
Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578-79 (1975)).
28. See id. at 280.
29. Id. at 280 n.7.
30. Id. (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974); Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 565).
31. Id (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1972)).
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B. Refinement of the Narrow-Tailoring Doctrine in
Justice 0 'Connor's Jurisprudence
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
The Supreme Court held for the first time in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co. that race-preferential affirmative action measures are subject to strict
scrutiny.32 In that case, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to a
Richmond, Virginia, ordinance that required the city's prime contractors to
subcontract at least thirty percent of the value of the contracts to minority-
owned businesses. 33  Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor held that
Richmond's contracting scheme had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection because the means were not narrowly tailored to
remedy prior discrimination. 34 With palpable exasperation, Justice O'Connor
commented that "it is almost impossible to assess whether the Richmond Plan
is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to
identified discrimination in any way." 35 Justice O'Connor continued further,
finding that the city failed to establish a pressing need to implement race-based
hiring procedures. 6 "In this regard," the city failed to give any consideration
to race-neutral means of achieving its goals. 37 Justice O'Connor relied on
United States v. Paradise for the proposition that "'[i]n determining whether
race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including
the efficacy of alternative remedies."' 38  Unlike Paradise, however, Justice
O'Connor imposed the requirement of considering race-neutral alternatives on
the government agency in Croson, rather than merely placing that burden on
the courts. 39  In other words, an agency's failure to consider any race-neutral
32. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
33. Id. at 477.
34. Id. at 507-08.
35. Id. at 507.
36. Id. at 510 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
37. Id. The term "in this regard" is important because it clarifies that the goal for race-
neutral alternatives in the government procurement context must be to remedy prior
discrimination.
38. Id. at 507 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)). Paradise is
notable for Justice O'Connor's strong dissent, which castigates the district court for imposing a
racial "promotion quota without consideration of any of the available alternatives." Paradise,
480 U.S. at 200 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice William Brennan, writing for the plurality,
responded that these alternatives had not been provided to the district court. Id. at 177 n.28
(opinion of Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor concluded, however, that without
exploring the available alternatives, no court could conclude that a racial quota was necessary.
Id. at 200 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 ("There is no evidence in this record that the Richmond
City Council has considered any alternatives to a race-based quota." (emphasis added)).
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
alternative became an independent basis for invalidating race-conscious
governmental action under the strict scrutiny analysis.4 °
Justice O'Connor found no evidence that Richmond considered any
alternatives to its plan, which she considered to be a race-based quota.41 In the
Court's discussion of the consideration of race-neutral means, Justice
O'Connor proffered that the city might have increased minority contracting
participation (that is, overcoming the absence of sufficient capital and inability
to meet bonding requirements) by establishing a race-neutral financing
42program for small firms. Writing separately, Justice Scalia suggested that a
preference for small or new businesses could also have satisfied Richmond's
legitimate interest in enabling those previously excluded by discrimination to
compete in the field.43
Although Justice O'Connor did not describe the full extent of the requisite
consideration of race-neutral alternatives, her opinion reflects an insistence that
public agencies' affirmative action program analysis must include serious
research. In other words, rigorously evaluating race-neutral alternatives is not
merely a matter of prudent public administration, but a requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause. Most significantly, Justice O'Connor firmly rejected
Richmond's attempt to predicate its program on a national congressional
report, insisting that "[i]f all a state or local government need do is find a
congressional report ... to enact [a race-conscious policy], the constraints of
the Equal Protection Clause will, in effect, have been rendered a nullity.
' 44
Moreover, in her discussion of the requisite factual predicate that government
agencies must make in order to justify racial preferences on the basis of prior
discrimination, Justice O'Connor detailed at length the nature of
"particularized findings" required.45 Beyond criticizing Richmond's evidence
40. Accord Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 624 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the FCC "never attempted to assess what alternatives to racial classifications might
prove effective" before implementing a program that provided racial and ethnic preferences in
proceedings for new licenses and transfers of existing licenses). Interestingly, the FCC had
formally solicited comments about whether effective race-neutral measures might achieve its
goals. Id. at 624-25. This process had, however, been halted as a result of a congressional
appropriations measure. Id. at 625. For this reason, Justice O'Connor concluded that the FCC
"never determined that it ha[d] any need to resort to racial classifications," when race-neutral
alternatives were, in fact, available. Id.
41. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
44. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
45. In addition, Justice O'Connor defined the problem that state and local governments had
to solve before they could use race as a factor in awarding contracts. In particular, Justice
O'Connor limited the use of race in contracting to remedying discrimination and required courts
to make "particularized findings" identifying that discrimination. Id. at 497-98 (quoting Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (opinion of O'Connor, J.)). She declared:
Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the scope of the injury
and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects. Such findings also serve to
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and thus establishing an evidentiary threshold for race-based contracting
programs, Justice O'Connor suggested the kind of empirical data that could
help establish an inference of discrimination.46 In this way, Justice O'Connor
took a step toward formalizing the use of program evaluations by government
and reviewing courts.
Justice O'Connor stated that government agencies need to examine
situations:
Where there is a significant statistical disparity between the number
of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a
particular service and the number of such contractors actually
engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors, an
inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.
47
The decision does not discuss in detail the kind of program analysis to satisfy
the race-neutral alternatives required in Croson, for the simple reason that
Richmond failed to consider any alternatives at all.
2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Adarand involved a constitutional challenge to a Department of
Transportation program that compensated recipients of prime government
contracts who hired subcontractors certified as a small business "controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." 48  The regulations
implementing the contracting preference provided a presumption that minority
groups qualify as "socially disadvantaged. 49 Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court, which held by a five-to-four majority that strict scrutiny is now the
standard of constitutional review for federal programs that use racial or ethnic
assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of
equality itself.
Id. at 510. As a result of this passage in Croson, a new disparity study industry evolved, and
produced about two hundred state and local contracting studies. Whereas these studies generally
find some types of disparities, they do not always support the use of race-conscious remedies.
Measuring the relative availability and capacity of Minority and Women's Business Enterprise-
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (MWBE-DBE) and non-MWBE-DBE firms is still a
controversial activity. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion set a clear framework
for the tasks that need to be performed before race can be used in state and local public
contracting. For a discussion of the problems in implementing the O'Connor formula, see
generally George R. La Noue, Who Counts?: Determining the Availability of Minority Businesses
for Public Contracting After Croson, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 793 (1998).
46. Croson,488U.S.at509-10.
47. Id. at 509 (emphases added).
48. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205-07 (1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. Id. at 207.
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classifications in governmental decision-making. 50 Noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment "protects persons, not groups," the Court held "that all
governmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized 'as
in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited'-should be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws has not been infringed."51  The Court concluded that
"government may treat people differently because of their race only for the
most compelling reasons, '52 and' that such government classifications must be
judicially subjected to strict scrutiny, including the requirements of narrow
tailoring.53
As in Croson, Justice O'Connor's opinion looked to the defendant's
consideration of the viability of race-neutral policies as one of the key factors
of the narrow tailoring test. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor directed the
district court on remand to "address the question of narrow tailoring in terms of
our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, for example, whether there was 'any
consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business
participation' in government contracting."
54
3. Grutter v. Bollinger
For the first time since Bakke,55 the Court applied its affirmative action
jurisprudence to higher education in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law
School affirmative action case.56  Writing once again for a divided Court,
Justice O'Connor found that the Law School's admissions plan met the
requirements of narrow tailoring, including the requisite serious consideration
of race-neutral alternatives. 57 In this respect, Justice O'Connor rejected the
plaintiffs' argument58 that the Law School's plan was not narrowly tailored
50. Id. at 227. Technically, Justice O'Connor's opinion was the opinion of the Court only
to the extent that it was not inconsistent with Justice Scalia's concurrence, which did not differ
from Justice O'Connor's opinion in the present context.




54. Id. at 237-38.
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
56. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
57. See id. ("The Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a
'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in
securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.").
58. Justice O'Connor's opinion also reversed the district court's ruling that, regardless of
whether race-neutral methods would in fact have achieved Michigan's goals, "the law school's
failure to consider them ... prior to implementing an explicitly race-conscious system militates
against a finding of narrow tailoring." Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
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because it failed to consider all available race-neutral alternatives.59 Rather,
Justice O'Connor held that the Law School met the standard for serious
consideration of race-neutral alternatives, which she set forth in the clearest
judicial formulation to date:
Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable
race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose
between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a
commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all
racial groups. Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will
achieve the diversity the university seeks.
60
In other words, universities must rigorously evaluate appropriate race-neutral
policies to determine the extent to which they support the institution's specific
diversity goals.
61
Applying this stringent standard, Justice O'Connor nevertheless agreed with
the court of appeals that the Law School's consideration of race-neutral
alternatives was sufficient.62  Given the limited extent of the Law School's
consideration, the Court was able to reach this result only by relying upon
63Michigan's good faith. Instead of assessing the University's actualevaluation of race-neutral alternatives, the Court merely rejected the
59. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. See COLEMAN ET AL., RACE-NEUTRAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 6, at 5
(discussing that some race-neutral policies will be subject to strict scrutiny if the policy has some
racial intent and effect).
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40. Interestingly, the court of appeals reasoned that courts
"are ill-equipped to ascertain which race-neutral alternatives merit which degree of
consideration." Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 751 (6th Cir. 2002). Arguably, Justice
O'Connor attempts to conduct precisely this form of evaluation, doing so in a manner that wholly
failed to comply with professional standards for educational evaluation, without assessing, in any
meaningful sense, the nature of Michigan's evaluative process, choosing instead to assess the
workability of alternatives suggested by the district court and the Solicitor General's brief. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. A kinder alternative explanation is that Justice O'Connor was tacitly
pursuing the first step in a dyadic process. In the first step, one uses a relatively rudimentary
analysis to determine which race-neutral alternatives are "workable." In the second step, one uses
"1serious consideration"-which is to say, appropriate educational evaluation-to determine
which workable alternatives can meet the institution's compelling interest.
63. See id. at 339-41, 343 ("We take the Law School at its word .... "). Michigan argued
that racial preferences were necessary because race-neutral alternatives are unworkable. First,
Michigan argued that percentage plans are based on racial segregation in public schools,
eliminate individualized review, and are inconsistent with the flagship public university's stature
as a national institution. Brief for Respondents at 44-47, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516). Second, Michigan asserted that percentage plans are not race-neutral, but instead
represent efforts to circumvent legal prohibitions on the use of racial preferences in some states.
Id. at 44. Third, Michigan argued that a percentage plan could not yield sufficient student racial
diversity because of the demographic characteristics of Michigan's public high schools. Id. at
48-49.
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alternatives suggested by the district court (that is, employing a lottery method
or de-emphasizing objective academic credentials) because they would have
forced Michigan to compromise core values such as "academic quality."
64
Similarly, the Court rejected the "percentage plans" recommended by the
Solicitor General on two grounds: it was not clear to the Court how such plans
would apply to graduate and professional schools65 and "even assuming such
plans are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not
just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the
university." 66 The Court stated that "[w]e are satisfied that the Law School
adequately considered race-neutral alternatives currently capable of producing
a critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic
selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission." 67 In short, the
Court decided to "take the Law School at its word that it would 'like nothing
better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula.'
68
To justify this leniency, the Court indicated that the First Amendment
affords the University a certain degree of "educational autonomy" in
determining how best to accomplish its mission of achieving diversity. 69 This
reasoning is questionable on two grounds. First, as Justice Clarence Thomas
argued in his separate opinion, it does not appear that the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence supports the degree of deference that the Grutter
70opinion extended to the Law School. Indeed, as Justice Thomas points out,
the Court's strict scrutiny analysis does not entitle academic institutions to any
deference. 7 1 Second, the Court's recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,
including its opinion in Croson,7 2 proscribes the very deference that theGrutter opinion affords.73 The Croson Court held that, while the government
64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
65. See id. at 340.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 343 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 34, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 2-
241)).
69. Id. at 329.
70. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the
majority's "unprecedented deference" to the Law School). Justice O'Connor argues, however,
that "[o]ur scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into
account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the
university." Id. at 328 (majority opinion).
71. See id. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, Justice
Kennedy argues that Justice O'Connor's deference to Michigan constitutes an abandonment of
strict scrutiny. Id. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) ("[S]imple
legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice.").
73. For an extended form of this argument, see Douglas M. Raines, Comment, Grutter v.
Bollinger's Strict Scrutiny Dichotomy: Diversity is a Compelling State Interest, but the University
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is normally "entitled to ... deferential review by the judiciary, 74 the standard
changes when the government invokes the use of racial classifications.
75
Arguably, Justice O'Connor's approach in Grutter subverted the strict scrutiny
standard as enunciated in Croson.76 Specifically, the Court's deference to the
university "confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational
objective with deference to the implementation of this goal. 77
The deference which Justice O'Connor afforded to Michigan's Law School
should not obscure the significance of her continued emphasis of such strict
scrutiny elements as the requirement of "serious consideration." While Justice
O'Connor gave the Law School the benefit of the doubt in this case, her
consistent application of the stringent race-neutral-alternatives standard,
coupled with the outcome in Gratz, suggests the continuing vitality of the
"serious consideration" requirement, as would later be confirmed in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.78 What, then,
explains the disparity between Justice O'Connor's strong doctrinal language
and its weak enforcement in the Grutter decision? One possibility is that it
was not clear to Justice O'Connor what meta-evaluative standards should be
applied in assessing the sufficiency of an institution's serious consideration.
The requisite evaluative standards had not been established in prior opinions,
briefed by the parties, or developed in the scholarly literature. In other words,
the apparent discrepancy in Justice O'Connor's opinion may be explained by
her understandable inability to traverse the gap in existing jurisprudence that
this Article endeavors to fill.
C. Developments Since Justice 0 'Connor's Retirement
Since Justice O'Connor's retirement, the most important development in this
area of jurisprudence has been the Court's decision to emphasize that strict
scrutiny requires public schools to seriously consider race-neutral79
alternatives. In Parents Involved, the Court used this requirement to strike
down a public school district's reliance on race in student assignments." Chief
Justice Roberts wrote for a four-Justice plurality, concluding that the school
districts' racial classifications were "not narrowly tailored to the goal of
of Michigan's Law School's Admissions Plan is Not Narrowly Tailored, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 845,
860-71 (2006).
74. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
75. ldat500-01.
76. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id at 388 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
79. Id. at 2746 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion); see also id at 2792-93
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that "a more nuanced,
individual evaluation... would be informed by Grutter").
80. Id. at 2738, 2746 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
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achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial
diversity." 81 "In design and operation," the Chief Justice wrote, "the plans are
directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has
repeatedly condemned as illegitimate." 82  The district court found that the
School Board failed to seriously consider any race-neutral alternatives.83 For
example, School Board Member Michael Preston testified that he "chose not to
read" a less racially restrictive Urban League proposal because, in his words,
"I'd rather play with my bass lunker fishing game." 84  This indifference
rendered the district's plan unconstitutional, as Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized that school officials failed to demonstrate "serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.
85
III. EXTRA-JUDICIAL SOURCES OF GUIDANCE
Under both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, federal
agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education and the Civil
Rights Commission, have provided largely informal guidance regarding race-
neutral alternatives. In some cases, this guidance has been detailed and
extensive. Generally speaking, however, this guidance has not been closely
followed, even by other federal agencies. 86 Non-governmental organizations,
such as the College Board, have also provided useful guidance on this
requirement, directing their analysis toward institutions of higher learning.
87
A. Clinton Administration Guidance
During the Clinton Administration, the U.S. Department of Justice issued an
important affirmative action guidance memorandum to regulatory agencies in
the wake of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. The DOJ Guidance
Memorandum, issued by then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger,
provided preliminary legal guidance on Adarand's standard for "assessing the
constitutionality of federal affirmative action programs," including educational
programs.8
9
Foreshadowing Justice O'Connor's subsequent Grutter opinion, the DOJ
Guidance Memorandum counseled that the government need only seriously
81. Id.at2755.
82. Id.
83. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 970-75 (9th
Cir. 2004), aff'd, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd and remanded by 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
84. Id. at 974. Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain helpfully identifies this diversion as a handheld
electronic simulation game. Id. at 975.
85. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339
(2003)); see also id at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
86. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 71.
87. See COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at iii.
88. DOJ Guidance Memorandum, supra note 18, at 171.
89. Id.
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consider race-neutral alternatives, but need not actually exhaust them.
90
Moreover, the Department of Justice advised that the government may, "[i]n
some situations, . . . draw upon a previous consideration of race-neutral
alternatives" rather than continually evaluating prospects in light of each new
program. 91 The Department of Justice admonished agencies that, "[i]n the
absence of prior experience, consider race-neutral alternatives at the time it
adopts a racial or ethnic classification."
92
This admonition appears to have been largely ignored by federal agencies,
which, notoriously, have largely failed to consider race-neutral alternatives in a
serious manner during either the Clinton or George W. Bush
Administrations.
93
B. Bush Administration Guidance
Following Grutter, the Bush Administration Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) published two monographs about race-neutral
alternatives, focusing mainly on undergraduate admissions in states where race
preferences have been barred.94 These reports describe an array of race-neutral
alternatives, including programs that seek socioeconomic diversity, percentage
plans based on geographic diversity, and approaches that rely on
comprehensive, individualized review without racial preferences.
95
OCR also prepared an additional report, Inclusive Campuses: Diversity
Strategies for Private Colleges,96 which discussed race-neutral alternatives in
private undergraduate colleges and universities, but canceled its projected
volume on graduate and professional schools. Inclusive Campuses was briefly
posted on the official website of the Department of Education, but was never
issued in hard copy. Inclusive Campuses explicitly detailed practices for
proper evaluation of race-neutral practices:
[I]dentifying and evaluating a wide range of policies; articulating
underlying facts that will prove whether a race-neutral plan works;
90. Id. at 190 n.38 ("[W]hile strict scrutiny requires serious, good faith consideration of
race-neutral alternatives, strict scrutiny does not require exhaustion of every such possible




93. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 71 ("Most agencies could not
demonstrate that they consider race-neutral alternatives before resorting to race-conscious
programs. Although DOJ offered post-Adarand guidance, agencies generally do not adhere to
it.").
94. ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 12; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE-
NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES
TO DIVERSITY (2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edlite-raceneutralreport.html
[hereinafter INNOVATIVE APPROACHES].
95. ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 12; INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 94.
96. INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES, supra note 4.
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collecting empirical research to demonstrate success; ensuring such
assessments are based on current, competent, and comprehensive
data; reviewing race-conscious plans periodically to determine the
need for continuing them; and analyzing data to establish causal
relationships before concluding that a race-neutral plan is
ineffective.
97
Although OCR never published these standards in hard copy, and has
apparently withdrawn them, they represent OCR's clearest articulation to date
of the basic evaluative standards for post-secondary educational institutions to
use in evaluating race-neutral alternatives, and they have subsequently been
endorsed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
98
In addition, OCR has continued some post-Grutter enforcement activity
related to race preferences in education. In an important 2004 case, the
Department of Education denied Magnet School Assistance Program funding
to the Berkeley, California, public school district based on OCR's
determination that Berkeley's proposal for racial and ethnic classifications in
its student-assignment program had not demonstrated that it had first seriously99
considered race-neutral alternatives. OCR has placed a similar emphasis on
institutional consideration of race-neutral alternatives in higher education.
OCR has requested in its investigations "each effort by any university
component or office to consider the continued necessity for the use of race and
national origin and/or whether there are workable race-neutral alternatives to
the use of race and national origin in any aspect of the financial aid
program."
00
C. Guidance from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
In September 2005, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a lengthy
report, Federal Procurement After Adarand, examining the extent to which
federal agencies have complied with their constitutional obligation to seriously
consider race-neutral alternatives.' 01 The Commission found that federal
agencies have "give[n] little thought to their legal obligations" under this
97. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi (summarizing INCLUSIVE
CAMPUSES, supra note 4).
98. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi.
99. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26 n.8,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908).
Marcus decided this case while delegated the authority of Assistant Secretary of Education for
Civil Rights.
100. ARTHUR L. COLEMAN ET AL., COLL. BD., FEDERAL LAW AND FINANCIAL AID: A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING DIVERSITY-RELATED PROGRAMS 86 (2005), available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod-downloads/diversitycollaberative/diversity-manual.pdf. For a
discussion of the significance of OCR's role in the system of civil rights enforcement, see
Kenneth L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-Semitism and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 837, 856-58 (2007).
101. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at ix.
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requirement, have disagreed with one another about the ramifications of the
Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions, and have largely ignored the
Department of Justice's guidance.'
02
The Commission endorsed OCR's Inclusive Campuses report, citing the
findings and lauding its "useful guidance regarding serious consideration of
race-neutral alternatives in higher education."'10 3  Ironically, however, the
Commission found that the Department of Education had not complied with
the serious consideration requirement it had imposed on its grantees. 
0 4
Nevertheless, the Commission relied on the Department of Education's
conceptual framework to develop its own standards for race-neutral evaluation
in the context of government procurement.' 0 5 The Commission's framework
consisted of four basic elements, each of which is clearly applicable outside of
the narrow confines of procurement law:
Element 1: Standards-Agencies must develop policy, procedures,
and statistical standards for evaluating race-neutral alternatives....
Element 2: Implementation-Agencies must develop or identify a
wide range of race-neutral approaches, rather than relying on only
one or two generic governmentwide programs....
Element 3: Evaluation-Agencies must measure the effectiveness of
their chosen procurement strategies based on established empirical
standards and benchmarks. The end goal should be to eliminate
reliance on race-conscious programs....
Element 4: Communication-Agencies should communicate and
coordinate race-neutral practices to ensure maximum efficiency and
consistency govemmentwide.
10 6
The Commission's evaluative standards largely parallel OCR's. The
Commission's most important contribution to the evolution of program
evaluation standards may have been its insistence that agencies communicate
with one another about race-neutral best practices. This would help ensure that
agencies are aware of new best practices as they develop-consistent with
Justice O'Connor's admonition to the University of Michigan Law School in
Grutter. 1
07
Like previous efforts, the Commission's report was largely ignored. There
is no indication that federal agencies have yet complied with these standards,
or adjusted their activities in response to the Commission's criticisms.
102. Id. at 71.
103. Id. at 78.
104. See id
105. Id.
106. Id. at xi.
107. See id. at 29, 75-76.
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D. Non-Governmental Guidance
The College Board, in its conferences and publications, has taken the lead in
informing institutions about post-Grutter ground rules, particularly in reports
prepared by former Clinton Administration OCR officials Arthur L. Coleman
and Scott R. Palmer. The College Board concluded that the determination of
whether a program is narrowly tailored requires consideration of four factors:
(1) Whether the use of race is necessary in the light of institutional
goals;
(2) Whether the use of race is sufficiently flexible in light of
institutional goals;
(3) Whether the impact of the use of race on non-qualifying
candidates is sufficiently diffuse;
(4) Whether there is an end in sight to the use of race and a process
of periodic review.
10 8
Accomplishing these tasks would require educational institutions to designate
responsibility, allocate additional resources, and create processes for reporting
the outcomes. In the same report, Coleman and Palmer set forth useful
standards or "practice pointers" for the evaluation of race-neutral programs.,°9
The College Board standards are similar in some ways to the OCR and Civil
Rights Commission recommendations and are presented with impressive
clarity:
1. A body with the responsibility and authority for examining and
making policy recommendations regarding race-neutral alternatives
should be charged with periodically researching and evaluating
possible race-neutral alternatives in light of institution-specific,
diversity-related goals.
2. A record of practices considered, along with the accompanying
evaluations regarding their viability, should be maintained. In
addition, evidence-based foundations for making judgments about
which practices to try and which to reject should be documented.
(Research studies that include projections about likely results over
time may also be useful, especially where comprehensive historical
foundations for those conclusions do not exist.)
3. The entire array of race-neutral practices pursued by the institution
should be well-documented, along with an ongoing record of
research regarding the effectiveness of those practices in achieving
institutional diversity goals. I10
Coleman and Palmer concluded that "a pattern that reflects serious
consideration, experimentation, and evaluation leading to research-based
108. See COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 17.
109. Id. at 53.
110. Id.
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policy changes is more likely to reflect the kind of deliberate and earnest
consideration of alternatives that may justify some federal court deference to
academic judgments regarding race-neutral alternatives."'"I Coleman and
Palmer's emphasis on serious consideration, evaluation, periodic review,
empirical review, and careful documentation parallels prior judicial decisions
and regulatory guidance. But unlike earlier guidance, Coleman and Palmer
directly enumerated experimentation as a factor for developing race-neutral
alternatives.1 12
Similarly, a report issued by the American Association for the Advancement
of Science urged science, technology, engineering, and mathematics educators
to adopt a systematic approach to designing race-neutral alternatives.
Specifically, the report stated: "Program activities should be designed to
address specific diversity needs, be justified with research into past and present
practices, and take into account the positive and possible negative impacts on
other studies (minority and non-minority alike)."
13
It is unlikely that program evaluations, such as those discussed by Coleman
and Palmer, are being implemented by educational institutions. And if they
are, the results have not been made public. Establishing the causes of this
academic reticence can only be speculative. Yale Law School scholars Ian
Ayres and Sidney Foster use the ironic title "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" to suggest
that the Michigan decisions create a perverse incentive not to create
institutional policies or evaluations about admissions preferences, so long as
institutions claim to be only using individualized considerations regarding
race. 114 Some institutions may be reluctant to admit they are using race in
admissions at all. They may not wish to reveal the extent of this reliance to
their campus community, peer competitors, or the general public for fear that
disclosure of their procedures may provoke litigation by public interest
advocacy groups, or administrative investigations conducted by OCR at the
instigation of advocacy groups." 5 The difficulty of evaluating race-neutral
alternatives is that it requires schools to divulge admission practices and
outcomes the institutions may wish to conceal from public view. 116 However,
if an institution had to reveal in discovery that it failed to consider race-neutral
Ill. Id.
112. See id.
113. SHIRLEY M. MALCOM ET AL., AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., STANDING
OUR GROUND: A GUIDE FOR STEM EDUCATORS N THE POST-MICHIGAN ERA 36 (2004).
114. Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and
Gratz 40-41 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. in Law, Econ., and Pub. Policy Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 287, 2005), available at http://lsr.nelIco.org/yale/lepp/papers/287
("Quantifiable but unquantified programs may sail under the radar screen of constitutional
review.... So long as a decisionmaker does not tell... the Supreme Court will be loath to ask
.... ").
115. See MALCOM ET AL., supra note 113, at 5-6 (suggesting that schools are taking an
extremely cautious approach to race-conscious decision-making in light of Gratz and Grutter).
116. See COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 56.
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alternatives, it would be difficult to defend the continuing use of racial
preferences in litigation. Nevertheless, the legal obligation to engage in
serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives as described in previous
sections should be obvious.''
7
IV. SET7ING MEASURABLE GOALS AND STANDARDS FOR CONSIDERATION OF
RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES
As we have seen, Justice O'Connor has insisted that equal protection
requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks."" 8 From this,
it is clear that these alternatives should be evaluated to determine the extent
that they will achieve the university's diversity goals. What is less clear is the
extent to which race-neutral alternatives may be motivated by, or evaluated
against, diversity goals, which are themselves race-conscious. In other words,
to what extent may institutions pursue such facially neutral programs as
percentage plans or socioeconomic preferences, if their goal is to increase
minority student enrollment? When race-neutral alternatives are evaluated,
should they be measured against essentially race-conscious goals such as
student racial diversity, or must they be evaluated against other criteria?" 9 As
we will show, diversity efforts should be evaluated against the educational
benefits that they are intended to achieve. The pursuit of such race-neutral
goals does not trigger strict scrutiny when advanced by race-neutral means.
When diversity efforts, including race-neutral alternatives, are pursued in order
to increase multi-factored race-conscious diversity objectives, however, strict
scrutiny will be triggered, but it will be satisfied where no less intrusive means
are available.
A. Race-Conscious Ends
1. Race-Conscious Ends and Strict Scrutiny
Determining how race-neutral alternatives should be evaluated is a different
inquiry than questioning whether the use of race-neutral procedures motivated
by racial purposes will trigger strict scrutiny. The answer to the latter question
is clear: governmental action always triggers strict scrutiny when
"discriminatory intent or purpose" is a primary motivating factor.120 This is an
117. Seeid.at50.
118. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003).
119. This issue is explored in Kenneth L. Marcus, Diversity and Race-Neutrality, 103 Nw. U.
L. REv. COLLOQUY 163 (2008), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/39/
LRCo1l2008n39Marcus.pdf.
120. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
Since Washington v. Davis, the Court has established that equal protection fundamentally protects
citizens from discrimination motivated by racial classifications. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
Moreover, as R. Richard Banks pointed out, even prior to the adoption of the discriminatory
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important point to remember in light of the widespread, casual assumption that
many public universities have turned to socioeconomic affirmative action and
other race-neutral approaches to increase their enrollment of minority
students.
121
The Court has not held "that race-neutral policies intended to benefit racial
minorities are exempt from strict scrutiny,"1  and could not do so consistent
with Croson.12 3 Moreover, these governmental procedures, such as those at
issue in Croson, may be particularly worrisome to the extent that they
represent hidden legislative racial motivations, which are less amenable to
public, administrative, and judicial scrutiny. 124  The Court has rejected
precisely this form of subterfuge in other contexts, including in higher
education. 125 The Court has addressed this concern in a voting district case,
explaining that "statutes are subject to strict scrutiny ... not just when they
contain express racial classifications, but also when, though race neutral on
purpose standard, the Court had invalidated race-neutral policies designed in part to harm racial
minorities. R. Richard Banks, The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection Analysis, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 573, 576 (2003).
121. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral
Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2346 (2000) (observing that "a number of public
universities have turned to disadvantage-based and other race-neutral approaches to increase the
enrollment of minority students").
122. Banks, supra note 120, at 578.
123. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Absent searching
judicial inquiry into the justification for [race-conscious] measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."). As Richard
Fallon has argued,
it is at least oddly disparate to maintain, on the one hand, that explicitly race-conscious
reasoning is permissible in justifying an economically based affirmative action
program, but to insist, on the other hand, that race-consciousness is an evil that may not
be reflected in an affirmative action program's distributive criteria.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1913, 1949-50 (1996).
124. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1795-96 (1996) ("Racially
motivated legislation is inherently suspect, but unacknowledged racial motivation by legislatures
is all the more worrisome.").
125. For an analysis of the "subterfuge" problem facing racially motivated race-neutral
alternatives, see Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action
Programs After Miller v Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1289, 1291-92 (1997). Brian Fitzpatrick compares this "subterfuge" with the earlier "race-
neutral" practices clandestinely used to limit the number of Jewish students admitted into
selective higher education institutions in the twentieth century, such as the coded use of
"character" requirements. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Essay, Can Michigan Universities Use
Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 277, 279 n.10
(2007) (citing MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNoTr, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND
ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970 62 (1979)).
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their face, they are motivated by a racial purpose or object."' 126 For this reason,
facially race-neutral programs, such as percentage plans or socioeconomic
preferences, will be subject to strict scrutiny if they are instituted primarily to
achieve racially conscious goals, such as increased minority enrollment. 127 For
example, OCR has adopted the position that race-neutral criteria, used as a
proxy for race, should be subject to strict scrutiny in an important case
addressing a school district's use of socioeconomic status as a selection
criteria.
28
There is dictum in Justice Kennedy's Parents Involved opinion that may
suggest, at first blush, that there is now a fifth vote on the Supreme Court for
the position that racially motivated, facially neutral diversity programs should
not be subjected to strict scrutiny. 129  In that opinion, Justice Kennedy
suggested a number of facially race-neutral policies that school boards may
pursue, observing that "[t]hese mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead
to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she
is to be defined by race.' 130  Then, in a cryptic comment, Justice Kennedy
stated that "it is unlikely any of [these mechanisms] would demand strict
scrutiny to be found permissible." 131  Justice Kennedy cites the plurality
opinion in Bush v. Vera for the proposition that "'[s]trict scrutiny does not
apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of
race. ' ' 132 Justice Kennedy also quotes Vera's teaching: "'[e]lectoral district
lines are "facially race neutral" so a more searching inquiry is necessary before
strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of
126. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995). Equal protection concerns are
compounded when the state's goal is not only race-conscious and race-preferential, but also race-
exclusive. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-25 (describing Justice Powell's view in
Bakke that the diversity constituting a compelling governmental interest includes racial or ethnic
characteristics as only a "'single though important element"' (quoting Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.))).
127. Coleman and Palmer have repeatedly admonished that facially race-neutral policies may
in fact be race-conscious as a matter of law. COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 49.
128. Coleman observed from the complaints in an OCR case that, if the evidence shows "a
deliberate use of race-neutral criteria as a proxy for race," OCR would then apply Title VI strict
scrutiny standards. COLEMAN ET AL., RACE-NEUTRAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 6, at 5
(citing In re Wake County Pub. Sch. Sys., OCR Compl. Nos. 11-02-1044, 1104 & 1111 (Aug. 29,
2003)).
129. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
130. Id. Specifically, Justice Kennedy listed a number of acceptable mechanisms, "including
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
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"classifications based explicitly on race."' ' 133  Invoking Vera suggests that
only if the "predominant" motivation of a governmental education program is
racial will it require strict scrutiny review. As Brian Fitzpatrick has
persuasively argued, Justice Kennedy's most likely meaning is that, if the
Court adopts the "predominant" motivation standard from voting district cases
(as opposed to the traditional "but for" motivation standard used in other race-
proxy cases), then it would be more difficult for plaintiffs to make the requisite
showing to trigger strict scrutiny.' In other words, Justice Kennedy's dictum
seems consistent with the rule that government action always triggers strict
scrutiny when a primary motivating factor is based on discrimination by
race.
2. Race-Conscious Ends and Narrow Tailoring
To acknowledge that racially motivated, facially neutral diversity programs
trigger strict scrutiny does not, however, mean they are impermissible. Should
university administrators wish to implement such a program, they must meet
the requirements of narrow tailoring. 36 After all, the requirement to consider
race-neutral alternatives has always been a method of assessing the means by
which race-conscious government programs are implemented, rather than
assessing the purposes for why they are implemented. 137 It would be rather
133. Id. (quoting Vera, 517 U.S. at 958).
134. Fitzpatrick, supra note 125, at 290. Fitzpatrick writes that
the meaning Justice Kennedy most likely intended was one suggesting that, if the Court
adopts the "predominant" motivation standard from the voting district cases as opposed
to the more traditional "but-for" motivation standard it used in other race-proxy cases,
then it will be harder for plaintiffs to make the necessary showing to invoke strict
scrutiny.... I think the most that Justice Kennedy's opinion can be read to say is that
racial gerrymandering still must overcome strict scrutiny in order to comport with the
Constitution whenever, as in the voting district cases, the gerrymandering is
"predominantly" motivated by race.
Id. (footnote omitted).
135. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
136. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor may have flirted with the notion that race-neutral
alternatives must always be racially neutral in both ends and means. The University of Michigan
argued that purportedly race-neutral alternatives used in other states, such as percentage plans, are
not truly race-neutral because they represent an effort by preferential affirmative action. Brief for
Respondents, Gratz, supra note 63, at 44-45. Justice O'Connor was evidently moved by that
argument, because her opinion implicitly acknowledges that racially motivated plans may not be
race-neutral, and therefore may not satisfy the requirements of narrow tailoring, when she began
her discussion of percentage plans with the phrase "even assuming such plans are race-neutral."
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003). This phrase demonstrates that Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Court, considered the neutrality of race-conscious plans to be, at least, a
questionable matter. See COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 49. For purposes of satisfying
the narrow tailoring requirement, however, the question is not whether a purely neutral alternative
exists; rather, the question is whether there is a workable alternative that is less racially intrusive
than the program under consideration.
137. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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odd, after all, to suggest that a hidden racially conscious motivation could
render a facially neutral program more intrusive or more restrictive.
On the other hand, if racially motivated, facially neutral programs trigger
strict scrutiny to the same extent as race-conscious programs, then why must
they be seriously considered before a public university or other government
actor may implement the more explicit race-conscious program? Doesn't this
pose a conundrum where facially race-neutral alternatives may be used to
satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement for a race-preferential program, but
then cannot be implemented until after other race-neutral alternatives are first
considered? Actually, it does not. The race-neutral alternatives requirement
has never been a search for purity, but rather an effort to seek less burdensome
procedures along a continuum of race-consciousness.
1 38
In other words, whenever race-conscious classifications are used,
government is first required to consider a range of less racially discriminatory
alternatives, which may include some programs that are more neutral than
others. 139 Facially race-neutral procedures may have some advantages over
racially explicit classifications, even if such procedures are adopted with a
race-conscious goal. For example, race-neutral approaches avoid the practice
of defining individual applicants in racial or ethnic terms, whether the
applicants choose to be so identified or not. 14  As the Croson Court observed,
racial classifications "may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead
to a politics of racial hostility."' 41  Arguably, race-neutral means may be
preferred over race-conscious means, even to achieve race-conscious ends, if
procedural neutrality can diminish the politics of division and resulting racial
stigma. Moreover, racially neutral procedures may satisfy the Court's
preference for less racially intrusive methods, notwithstanding the motivations
138. Roughly speaking, the continuum ranges from racially preferential, race-exclusive
programs on one end, to non-race-conscious programs on the other. Strict racial quotas, race-as-
a-factor schemes, and facially neutral race-conscious plans occupy different positions along this
continuum.
139. It is not the case, as others have argued, that Adarand and Croson "leave open the
question whether race-neutral alternatives are constitutional because they satisfy strict scrutiny or
because they are exempt from strict scrutiny." Banks, supra note 120, at 578-79. Some race-
neutral alternatives surely are constitutional because they are exempt from strict scrutiny-
namely, those that are not motivated by race-conscious purposes or effects. Other alternatives are
equally constitutional because they satisfy strict scrutiny-namely, those race-conscious
alternatives that are motivated by a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to the extent that
less restrictive means have been considered. However, some facially race-neutral alternatives
will likely not be constitutional at all, such as those that are racially motivated but not properly
justified by a compelling governmental interest, or are not narrowly tailored in an appropriate
fashion.
140. See Ayres, supra note 124, at 1797 ("Race-neutral means ... do not expose society to
the intrusive painful process of defining the race of individual citizens ....").
141. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.) (plurality opinion).
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for implementing the procedure. 142  In general, it may be that the Court
considers racially motivated race-neutral procedures to be "less odious" than
racially motivated race-conscious procedures, although both may be
"constitutionally suspect."' 14 3 For this reason, racially motivated but facially
neutral programs may be considered as part of an array of less intrusive
alternatives, although non-racially motivated programs should be considered as
well.
3. Race-Conscious Ends and Multi-Factored Diversity
Is it the goal of race-neutral policies, then, to increase the number of
minority students? 144  Many commentators assume that this is exactly what
race-neutral alternatives should achieve. 145  There is support for this view,
including Justice O'Connor's explicit admonition in both Croson and Adarand
that government agencies should consider "the use of race-neutral means to
increase minority business participation,"' 146 as well as language from Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved. 1
47
Grutter, however, instructs that institutions may not use a quota or seek
proportional representation, although they may seek a "critical mass" of
underrepresented minority students as part of a multi-factored approach to
diversity. 48 As Justice Powell wrote in the Bakke decision, Justice O'Connor
emphasized in Grutter that "race 'is only one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous
142. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 199-200 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(contending that the district court's race-based order was not narrowly tailored because there were
several less intrusive alternatives available); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (noting that
Richmond failed to give any consideration to race-neutral alternatives for construction contracts).
143. Fitzpatrick, supra note 125, at 288 (arguing further that "we might still prefer that
government actors pursue their compelling interests through racial proxies than through explicit
classifications").
144. More specifically, an institution's goal may be (as the University of Michigan Law
School's was) to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
333 (2003). The enrollment of minority students, however, was but a means to a greater end. In
particular, Michigan argued "that a 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to
further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body." Id.
145. Ian Ayres, for example, assumes that "both race-neutral and explicitly racial means
share the same race-conscious motivation of remedying past discrimination." Ayres, supra note
124, at 1783. In more recent years, of course, the emphasis has been on achieving diversity rather
than remedying past discrimination. See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Educational Diversity:
Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 558 (1998) (observing that the "focus on diversity
has ... been used to escape [the] ... remedial uses of race-consciousness").
146. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (quoted in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
237-38 (1995)). Without much exaggeration, Ian Ayres refers to this language as the "key
phrase" in Croson. Ayres, supra note 124, at 1791.
147. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2793
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34.
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student body."'' 149  Under Grutter, as under the Powell opinion in Bakke,
"'[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element."'
150
Justice O'Connor provided no further guidance on the rather nebulous
concept of critical mass. The most complicated admissions issue flowing from
Grutter is the extent of institutional discretion in weighing race or ethnicity as
a factor in an individualized admission system. 151 If the racial point advantage
is large enough, it will virtually guarantee admission to the favored group.
152
If it is too small, however, it may not achieve the institution's diversity goals.
Under Grutter, then, it would appear that universities may evaluate race-
neutral diversity programs by their ability to satisfy the institutions' own
compelling diversity goals, such as an institutional commitment to achieving
multi-factored diversity.' 53 An institution that only measured these programs
according to their ability to increase minority student enrollment would likely
present the appearance, in any subsequent litigation or OCR review, however,
of seeking only racial balance, rather than the constitutionally sanctioned goal
of multi-factored diversity. 154 A more appropriate method would be to assess
the program according to its ability to promote multiple forms of diversity (not
just racial and ethnic) in a manner that is tied to the institution's mission
statement.
B. Race-Neutral Ends
A program with race-neutral ends may not always be readily distinguishable
from programs with race-based goals. However, such a distinction is
important when determining whether strict scrutiny should apply. Generally,
such programs are often motivated by goals that are not racially conscious-
for example, increasing economic, social, ideological, or geographic diversity,
149. Id. at 330 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
150. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). Chief Justice Roberts voiced
his support for this interpretation, condemning approaches that "work[] backward to achieve a
particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the
level of diversity that provides the purported [educational] benefits." Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct.
at 2757 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
151. Mark C. Long estimated that the advantage given to underrepresented minority
applicants for admission at higher education institutions was equivalent to an increase of either
0.21 GPA points or 101 SAT points. Mark C. Long, Race and College Admissions, 86 REV.
ECON & STATS. 1020, 1025 (2004).
152. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273 (2003) (examining the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admission program, where, "as the University has conceded, the effect
of automatically awarding 20 points is that virtually every qualified underrepresented minority
applicant is admitted").
153. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25.
154. See Marcus, Diversity and Race-Neutrality, supra note 119, at 167.
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or supporting students who have overcome disadvantages, such as racial or
ethnic discrimination.
Indeed, the Department of Education has encouraged universities to pursue
diversity initiatives defined and motivated in purely race-neutral terms.155 In
its first monograph on race-neutral alternatives, OCR made no reference to
race or ethnicity when lauding the pursuit of diversity. 156  Instead, it
emphasized socioeconomic background, cultural heritage, intellectual
viewpoint, exceptional character, personal talents, extracurricular activities,
volunteer activities, work experiences, and dedication to particular causes.
157
Pointedly, OCR instructed that it is precisely that diversity, broadly
understood, that President Bush and the Department of Education want to help
educational institutions achieve."'
158
Similarly, the Solicitor General's Grutter brief argued that a race-neutral
purpose of admitting "candidates with diverse backgrounds and experiences
and viewpoints" (or candidates who have overcome barriers) could be
achieved through a
focus on numerous race-neutral factors including a history of
overcoming disadvantage, geographic origin, socioeconomic status,
challenging living or family situations, reputation and location of
high school, volunteer and work experiences, exceptional personal
talents, leadership potential, communication skills, commitment and
dedication to particular causes, extracurricular activities,
extraordinary expertise in a particular area, and individual outlook as
reflected by essays.1
59
In this sense, increased minority enrollment would be considered a notable
byproduct of race-neutral diversity measures, but not their direct goal. The
Solicitor General's amicus brief goes on to describe these indirect
consequences of diversity policies:
Nothing in the Constitution requires public universities and
governments to . . . tolerate artificial obstacles to educational
opportunity. Public universities have substantial latitude to tackle
such problems and ensure that universities and other public
institutions are open to all and that student bodies are experientially
diverse and broadly representative of the public. Schools may
identify and discard facially neutral criteria that, in practice, tend to
skew admissions in a manner that detracts from educational
diversity. They may also adopt admissions policies that seek to
155. See ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 12.
156. See INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 94.
157. See id
158. Id.
159. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19-20, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/
2002/3mer/1 ami/2002-0241 .mer.ami.pdf.
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promote experiential geographical, political, or economic diversity in
the student body, which are entirely appropriate race-neutral
governmental objectives. The adoption of such polices, moreover,
has led to racially diverse student bodies in other States.
60
In this section at least, the Solicitor General assumes that the goals of a race-
neutral policy must themselves be race-neutral, but indicates they may
indirectly increase the number of racial minority students.'61
A few years ago OCR investigated a series of complaints that alleged the
Wake County Public School System in North Carolina was using
socioeconomic preferences in student assignments as an impermissible proxy
for race. 162  If OCR had found that Wake County's vaunted race-neutral
program was indeed a race proxy, it would have had to determine whether this
usage was unconstitutional. 63 In fact, the OCR investigation determined that
Wake County's program was actually what it purported to be: a policy
designed to increase socioeconomic diversity, rather than an indirect effort to
achieve racial diversity. Although "race was not absent from the district's
considerations," OCR found that racial considerations were not the basis for
the district's decision.' 64 Consequently, it did not trigger the agency's use of
strict scrutiny.
To the extent that a university's multi-factored diversity objectives do
include race or ethnicity as a factor, consistent with the limitations set out in
Grutter, that factor may not provide the best measure by which to evaluate
race-neutral alternatives. After all, the Court did not find that multi-factored
diversity per se is compelling as an ultimate goal. Rather, the university's
compelling interest consists of 'the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body."" 165  Because student body diversity is only a means of
160. Id. at 13-14.
161. See id. at 13-15.
162. See COLEMAN ET AL., RACE-NEUTRAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 6, at 5
(describing In re Wake County Pub. Sch. Sys., OCR Complaint Nos. 11-02-1044, 1104 & 1111
(Aug. 29, 2003)).
163. Id. In order to determine whether facially race-neutral criteria are in fact a proxy for
race, Coleman notes that OCR considers
evidence of intent to discriminate, [including]: the impact of the official action (i.e.,
whether it impacts more heavily upon one racial group than another); a patter of
discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than race; the historical background of a
decision, particularly the specific sequence of events leading to the challenged policy;
departure from the normal procedural sequence; and the legislative or administrative
history, particularly contemporaneous statements of members of the decision-making
body.
Id. (alteration in original).
164. Id. (quoting In re Wake County Pub. Sch. Sys., OCR Complaint Nos. 11-02-1044, 1104
& 1111 (Aug. 29, 2003)).
165. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (quoting Brief for Respondents at i,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)). Specifically, the Law School maintained that its
"admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes,
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achieving these educational benefits, it stands to reason that universities should
evaluate diversity programs against their ability to achieve the educational
benefits themselves. 166 In other words, multi-factored diversity is at best an
indirect measure of the educational benefits that it is intended to increase.
Moreover, it is far from clear that racial diversity is a useful proxy for these
educational benefits, because research does not support the position that racial
diversity alone (without measures to ensure intergroup student engagement)
yields any measurable educational value.1 67 For this reason, the use of indirect
measures (such as simply counting multi-factored diversity) is also suspect,
because more direct measures of educational attainment may be available.
Indeed, the exclusive use of indirect measures may suggest that an institution's
proffered commitment to the educational benefits that flow from diversity is
itself a pretext for pursuing a somewhat more sophisticated form of racial
balancing.
C. Direct Measures
In the end, race-neutral alternatives must be assessed according to their
ability to achieve the ultimate race-neutral ends that race-preferential policies
are said to pursue-for example, increased intergroup understandings and
reduced use of stereotypes. In Grutter, Michigan asserted "only one
justification for [its] use of race in the admissions process: obtaining 'the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."' 168 It stands to
and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different races."' Id. at 333 (alteration in
original). Michigan argued that the "'classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply
more enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible variety of
backgrounds."' Id. at 330.
166. See Marcus, Diversity and Race-Neutrality, supra note 119, at 168.
167. See Mitchell J. Chang, Nida Denson, Victor Sdenz & Kimberly Misa, The Educational
Benefits of Sustaining Cross-Racial Interaction Among Undergraduates, 77 J. HIGHER ED. 430,
432 (2006). Of course, there is some dispute as to whether diversity yields educational benefits
even when it is accompanied by such intergroup engagements efforts. See U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION 15 (2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/I 12806diversity.pdf
(finding that "[t]here is little evidence that racial and ethnic diversity in elementary and secondary
schools results in significant improvement in academic performance," and that "[s]tudies of
whether racial and ethnic diversity result in significant social and non-educational benefits report
varied results"); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2776-79 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Scholars have differing opinions as to whether
educational benefits arise from racial balancing."). But that is a question for another day.
168. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (2003) (quoting Brief for Respondents at i, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241)). Specifically, the Law School maintained that its "admissions policy promotes
'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to
better understand persons of different races."' Id. at 333 (alteration in original). Michigan argued
that the "'classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible variety of backgrounds."' Id. at 330.
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reason, then, that universities should use a "direct measures" approach 169 to
evaluate whether race-neutral procedures replicate the educational benefits in
question, rather than the diverse student body that is intended as either a means
to achieve these benefits or a proxy for them. 170 This approach is consistent,
for example, with the approach of Judge Danny Boggs, who argued that
diversity goals can be effectively achieved with race-neutral measures that
directly focus on unique experiences and viewpoints, rather than using race
and ethnicity as proxies. 1
71
A direct measures approach has several notable advantages. First, it takes
institutions at their word when they maintain that they are seeking diversity not
as an end in itself, but rather as a means toward achieving the educational goals
to which courts defer. Second, it directly measures the institution's ability to
satisfy its ultimate goals, rather than merely assessing its ability to measure
only intermediate goals. Third, it enables institutions to maintain the holistic
approach so important to Justice O'Connor in Grutter,172 rather than requiring
them to reduce students to one-dimensional representatives of racial groups for
assessment purposes.
There are of course other versions of a direct measures approach, varying
with the ultimate ends that an institution might seek to achieve. For example,
Daria Roithmayr's direct measures approach would seek three separate
diversity-related goals:
Under a "direct measures" program, an applicant would be
granted an admissions preference if her application demonstrated that
she met any of three criteria: (1) that she had suffered from the
169. The term "direct measures" was put forward by Daria Roithmayr in Direct Measures:
An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 6 (2001), but Roithmayr had
a very different notion of what "direct measures" would look like.
170. See id. The extent to which Michigan was able to achieve measurable educational
benefits through its race-preferential admissions was (and is) a matter of vigorous debate.
Compare Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (No. 97-CV-75321), Grutter v. Bollinger, 127 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-
CV-75928), reprinted in Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan: The
Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363, 364-66 (1999)
(finding that "the benefits of diversity are evident ... in the studies of Michigan students"), with
ROBERT LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, A CRITIQUE OF THE
EXPERT REPORT OF PATRICIA GURIN IN GRATZ V. BOLLINGER 1-2 (2001) available at
http://www.ceousa.org/index.php?option=com docman&task=doc view&gid=154 (asserting that
Gurin's "findings are inconsistent and trivially weak" and some "should be ignored"). A similar
debate rages around the question of whether educational benefits flow from racial diversity in the
public schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2776-77 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the lack of academic consensus on this
issue); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 15 (2006) (describing the lack of consensus and
finding that "[t]here is little evidence that racial and ethnic diversity in elementary and secondary
schools results in significant improvement in academic performance").
171. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 791 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
172. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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effects of racial discrimination; (2) that she likely would contribute
an important and under-represented viewpoint to the classroom on
issues of social and racial justice; and/or (3) that she likely would
provide resources to underserved communities.!
73
Roithmayr argues that these direct measures do not create a racial
classification. Questions will undoubtedly arise if the direct measures
provide preferences only for those who have suffered the effects of racial
discrimination, but not other kinds of discrimination or disadvantage. Whether
this approach avoids constituting a racial classification or not, it is easy to see
how such measures could be used by administrators as a proxy for race
because, for example, certain groups are more likely to experience racial
discrimination than others.
The direct measures that institutions must use are those that align with the
educational benefits which it seeks. These should be based on the institution's
own independent judgment as to its academic mission. 75 What is important,
however, is that diversity programs be compared with race-neutral alternatives
according to their ability to achieve the educational outcomes that the
university determines to be critical in terms of its academic mission.
176
V. PROGRAM EVALUATION STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF
RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES
Serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives is a kind of program
evaluation; specifically, it is a form of educational evaluation. This is a well-
developed field in the social sciences with its own professional associations
and a code of ethics.1 77 There is also a sub-field called meta-evaluation, which
provides standards for the evaluation of evaluations. 178 In other words, courts
173. Roithmayr, supra note 169, at 6.
174. Id. at 14-27.
175. For a discussion of the problems that arise when an institution fails to follow its own
independent judgment, relying instead of the outside pressures exerted by an accrediting agency,
for example, see Kenneth L. Marcus, The Right Frontier for Civil Rights Reform, 19 GEO.
MASON U. Ctv. RTS. L.J. 401, 432-35 (forthcoming 2008).
176. See Marcus, Diversity and Race-Neutrality, supra note 119, at 171.
177. See, e.g., American Evaluation Association, http://www.eval.org (last visited Oct. 1,
2008) (program evaluation association website). The American Evaluation Association has about
5000 members in fifty states and more than sixty countries, as well as its own code of ethics.
American Evaluation Association, About Us, http://www.eval.org/aboutus/organization/
aboutus.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). There is also a Joint Committee on Standards for
Educational Evaluation, which has developed three sets of standards for this activity, and is
accredited by the American National Standards Institute. The Joint Committee on Standards for
Educational Evaluation, The Evaluation Center, W. Mich. Univ., http://www.wmich.edu/
evalctr/jc/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
178. See generally BLAINE R. WORTHEN & JAMES R. SANDERS, EDUCATIONAL
EVALUATION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND PRACTICAL GUIDELINES 369-401 (1987)
(chapter "discuss[ing] the concept of meta-evaluation, standards and criteria for evaluating
evaluations, and meta-evaluation procedures.., in education").
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do not have to reinvent the wheel when defining the requisite criteria for
analyzing whether institutions have seriously considered race-neutral
alternatives. The criteria already exist in established academic and
professional literature, and they undergird the Department of Education and
Civil Rights Commission's guidelines.
There are several forms of program evaluation: cost-benefit analysis,
179
natural experiments, randomized experimental design, 18 process evaluation,
and outcome evaluation. We will focus on the latter two forms because they
are most consistent with judicial interpretation of the requirement for serious
consideration of race-neutral alternatives, and provide institutions with the
greatest flexibility in meeting that standard.
Important program evaluation methods are: (1) clearly defining the question
to be asked or problem to be solved; (2) measuring program outcomes; (3)
"attributing outcomes to the program"; (4) determining the link between
program characteristics and outcomes; and (5) explaining the relationship of
these characteristics to outcomes.' 81  Defining, measuring, attributing,
determining, and explaining should all be elements for satisfying the serious
consideration of race-neutral alternatives requirement.
In this section, we will first explore how program evaluation has been used
generally in higher education, though not in the specific area of examining
race-neutral alternatives. Then, we will discuss the program evaluation
process in federal contracting to maximize the use of race-neutral alternatives.
Finally, we will turn to the specific application of program evaluation
techniques to achieving diversity in higher education.
The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, founded in
1975, has established an important set of standards for the evaluation of
education programs, 182 many of which are clearly applicable to diversity
programs in higher education. These standards have received widespread
179. Some commentators suggest that institutions use cost-benefit analysis or even marginal
cost-benefit analysis-how much benefit derives from an additional preferential student
admission-to determine exactly how many minority students need to be preferentially admitted
to meet the institution's diversity goals. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 114, at 5-6, 13. Ayres
and Foster acknowledge, however, that measuring "whether the costs [of preferences] outweigh
the benefits is inherently a normative one, turning on judgments about what 'price' to put on the
benefits of diversity." Id. at 77.
180. According to the United States Department of Education's strategic plan, 75% of any
federally funded research that involves causal questions should use a randomized experimental
design. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STRATEGIC PLAN 2002-2007 53 (2002), available at
http://www.edu.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2002-07/plan.pdf.
181. CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION: METHODS FOR STUDYING PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
75-76 (2d ed. 1998).
182. See WORTHEN & SANDERS, supra note 178, at 371-72; JAMES R. SANDERS, W. MICH.
UNIV., GENERAL BACKGROUND ON THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL
EVALUATION 1 (1999), available at http:/www.wmich.edu/evalctr/jc/JCGenlUBckgrnd.PDF
[hereinafter SANDERS, GENERAL BACKGROUND].
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attention over a period of many years, and are now well established as "the
canon of practice for educational evaluation."' 83 Several of these canonical
standards directly apply to the consideration of race-neutral diversity
programs. For example:
Report Clarity[.] Evaluation reports should clearly describe the
program being evaluated, including its context, and the purposes,
procedures, and findings of the evaluation, so that essential
information is provided and easily understood.
Evaluation Impact[.] Evaluations should be planned, conducted, and
reported in ways that encourage follow-through by stakeholders, so
that the likelihood that the evaluation will be used is increased.
Complete and Fair Assessment[.] The evaluation should be complete
and fair in its examination and recording of strengths and weaknesses
of the program being evaluated, so that strengths can be built upon
and problem areas addressed....
Disclosure of Findings[.] The formal parties to an evaluation should
ensure that the full set of evaluation findings along with pertinent
limitations are made accessible to the persons affected by the
evaluation and any others with expressed legal rights to receive the
results.
Reliable Information[.] The information-gathering procedures
should be chosen or developed and then implemented so that they
will assure that the information obtained is sufficiently reliable for
the intended use....
Systematic Information[.] The information collected, processed, and
reported in an evaluation should be systematically reviewed, and any
errors found should be corrected.
184
183. WORTHEN & SANDERS, supra note 178, at 371.
184. JOINT COMM. ON STANDARDS FOR EDUC. EVALUATION, THE PROGRAM EVALUATION
STANDARDS: SUMMARY OF THE STANDARDS, http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/jc/PGMSTNDS-
SUM.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) [hereinafter PROGRAM EVALUATION STANDARDS
SUMMARY]. The Joint Committee was originally initiated by the American Educational Research
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Council on Measurement
in Education. SANDERS, GENERAL BACKGROUND, supra note 182, at 1. The Joint Standards for
Evaluations of Educational Programs, Projects, and Materials was first published in 1981. Id.
Revised standards were published in 1994. Arlen R. Gullickson, Joint Committee on Standards
for Educational Evaluation Overview, http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/jc/JC-OverviewNet.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008). As this article goes to press, the Standards are currently undergoing
their second revision.
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These evaluative standards, at a higher level of generality, reflect the same
approach as the OCR strategies. 185 The U.S Commission on Civil Rights'
government contracting provisions also draw on similar themes.' 86  Any
serious program evaluation conducted by an institution of higher learning
must, at a minimum, satisfy the base requirements of the Joint Committee on
Standards for Educational Evaluation.
A. Program Evaluations in Higher Education
Program evaluations are common in higher education. Regional accrediting
associations require extensive self-study reports,1 87 followed by visiting
committees of representatives from peer institutions that write independent
evaluations before accreditation is granted. 188 Professional associations use
similar procedures to accredit the professional degree programs of their
member schools. 189 Even Division I athletic programs are accredited by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association.1 90 Loss of institutional accreditation
from a regional or professional association is often a near-death sentence that
requires strenuous efforts to remediate. For example, some types of federal aid
are not available to non-accredited institutions. 91  Even criticisms by
accreditors will be taken seriously and usually lead to reforms. Further, many
universities require periodic internal evaluations of both undergraduate and
185. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
187. For an example outline of an institutional self-study report required for accreditation,
see RUTGERS UNIV., GUIDE TO THE SELF-STUDY: EDUCATIONAL CHANGE AT RUTGERS (2008),
available at http://middlestates.rutgers.edu/pdf/guide.pdf.
188. educationUSA, Accreditation Guide, http://www.educationusa.state.gov/accred.htm
(last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
189. For example, the American Bar Association promulgates regulations for accrediting
law schools. See American Bar Association, Standards for Approval of Law Schools,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/standards.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
190. The certification rules can be found at NCAA Division I Athletics Certification
Program, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membershipsvcs/athletics certification/index.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2008). Among the areas for self study required in the certification process are
"diversity issues," and the NCAA specifies that "areas to review for diverse backgrounds or
underrepresented groups include, but are not limited to: race, ethnicity, creed, color, national
origin, age, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity, in addition to other areas such as
religion, marital status, education, income, geographic location and work experience." NCAA
Div. I COMM. ON ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION, NCAA ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION SELF-STUDY
INSTRUMENT 46 (2008).
191. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 28
(2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ous/intemational/edus/overview.doc; see
also Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University's Implied Obligations of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REv. 183, 194 n.52 (2000) ("The government has turned over
much of the oversight function to private accrediting agencies by requiring institutions receiving
federal funds to be accredited by federally approved and recognized accrediting agencies.").
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graduate programs that result in reports reviewed by administrators, faculty
senates, and sometimes governing boards.'
92
Traditionally, accreditation and other external evaluations focused on the
availability of institutional and program resources, as well as some outcome
indicators. Budgets, library or laboratory adequacy, credentials of the faculty,
and numbers of degrees produced were all measured, but in the past decade a
movement toward accountability has required schools to more directly assess
student learning. 193  Consequently, higher education institutions are feeling
pressure by governing boards, state coordinating agencies, regional accrediting
associations, and even the federal government to design and implement direct
and publicly accessible assessments of student learning. 194 Data is gathered
and analyzed at the course, program, and institutional level in order for the
institution to document what students have learned and correct teaching
techniques, curriculum, and degree requirements.195
Further, almost every higher education institution is constantly evaluating its
marketing regarding its admissions and financial aid programs. Based on
internal and external reports, institutions often will redesign high school visits
and on-campus recruitment programs, target new geographic or demographic
groups, and adjust their merit- and need-based financial aid strategies.
In short, campuses are quite familiar with the requirements of program
evaluation, though they have yet to see the connection between program
evaluation and the legal requirement for serious consideration of race-neutral
alternatives.
192. See, e.g., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Program Evaluation and
Assessment, http://www.dmi.uiuc.edu/progeval/progeval.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (noting
that the provost established a task force in 1994 for evaluations).
193. BUS.-HIGHER EDUC. FORUM, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
STUDENT LEARNING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 19-21 (2004) (discussing the
recent trend that focuses on student assignments and statewide scores, as opposed to focusing
primarily on the institution's characteristics).
194. See THE SEC'Y OF EDUC.'S COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., A TEST OF LEADERSHIP: CHARTING THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2006),
available at http://www.ed.gov.about/bdsxomm/list/hiedfuture/reports/finalreport.pdf (noting the
"limited and inadequate" data from higher education institutions).
195. See Peter McPherson & David Shulenburger, Improving Student Learning in Higher
Education Through Better Accountability and Assessment 5-14 (Nat'l Ass'n of State Univ. and
Land-Grant Colleges, Discussion Paper 2006), available at http://www.voluntarysystem.org/
docs/background/DiscussionPaperl_Apri106.pdf. For an example of assessment standards, see
the handbook MIDDLE STATES COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUC., STUDENT LEARNING ASSESSMENT:
OPTIONS AND RESOURCES (2d ed. 2007), which describes how to define student learning and
goals, evaluations, improvements, and how to reap the benefits of implementing the standards.
196. See Patricia M. McDonough, Buying and Selling Higher Education: The Social
Construction of the College Applicant, 65 J. HIGHER EDUC. 427, 431-32 (1994) (observing that
the "discovery of marketing by ... institutions" has led to these ongoing admissions and financial
aid evaluations employed by colleges and universities).
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B. Higher Education 's Failure to Engage in Visible Race-Neutral
Program Examinations
As described above, the culture of higher education is imbued with many
requirements for constant program evaluation in a myriad of areas.
Consequently, it might be reasonable to assume that, when confronted with a
constitutional requirement to seriously consider race-neutral alternatives before
using race-conscious means to achieve diversity, that higher educational
institutions would be among the best suited to engage in this evaluation. Every
institution has legal counsel, admissions officers, and faculty specialists in
disciplines who could engage in such an evaluation. Some state systems and
institutions of higher education have engaged in examinations of race-neutral
options after law or policy banned the use of racial preferences.1 97 But the
Gratz and Grutter decisions have not visibly produced comparable effort to
evaluate the availability of race-neutral alternatives by all institutions which
are using race-conscious programs. While some institutions may be engaging
in stealth programs of rigorous program evaluation, visible institutional
program evaluations that assess the feasibility of race-neutral programs are
few-to-none in states which do not bar the use of racially preferential programs
at public universities.
C. Race-Neutral Contracting Requirements and Procedures
As described earlier, the narrow tailoring requirement to examine race-
neutral alternatives was first established in the area of public contracting in
Croson, and then developed in subsequent litigation and federal regulations.,
98
Reviewing those developments can be instructive because the rules for
evaluating the use of race in public contracting are much more developed than
comparable rules in education.
Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion required that affirmative action in
government contracting be predicated upon a rigorous study of the extent of
discrimination in the relevant market.' 99  Justice O'Connor set a clear
framework for the tasks that need to be performed before race can be used in
state and local public contracting.
200
197. See, e.g., STUDENT ACADEMIC SERVS., UNIV. OF CAL., ELIGIBILITY IN THE LOCAL
CONTEXT PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT 1 (2002), available at http://www.university
ofcalifomia.edu/regents/regmeet/may02/304attach.pdf (reviewing California's state university
program that automatically admits the top four percent of high school graduates). In Florida, a
commission was established to investigate Governor Jeb Bush's race-neutral initiatives, which
"[g]uaranteed admission to the top 5% of all public high school graduates." ONE FLA.
ACCOUNTABILITY COMM'N, AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF EQUITY IN EDUCATION COMPONENTS
OF ONE FLORIDA 7 (2002), http://www.flboe.org/meetings/June02/OneFloridaAccountComm
Rep.pdf.
198. See supra Part lI.B.l.
199. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499-504 (1989).
200. See id. at 509-11.
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After Adarand, where Justice O'Connor's majority opinion applied the same
strict scrutiny standard as Croson to a federal program using race for local
201programs, the Clinton administration decided that various forms of
affirmative action using racial preferences in federal programs had to be
202mended, not ended. The most overt use of race was in federal contracting
programs, particularly in transportation programs. Since 1982, the
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program (DBE) required that ten percent of
all federal transportation dollars go to firms certified as DBEs.2° ' Such
certification was granted to firms owned by selected minorities and women on
the presumption these owners were "socially and economically
disadvantaged. 2 °4
The post-Adarand Clinton administrative amendments did not touch the
politically volatile definition of which groups were entitled to the presumption
of disadvantage, but they did make a number of other significant changes
aimed at narrowly tailoring the DBE program. 205  First, the economic
presumption of disadvantage was limited and defined objectively in dollar
terms, though the social presumption of disadvantage retained the concept of
privileging firm owners identified with particular groups.206  Second, the
national ten percent dollar quota was abandoned in favor of requiring each
state and local-recipient to determine the percentage of DBEs and non-DBEs
available to perform their construction contracts and then to set a "goal" based
on a prediction of the percentage of dollars DBEs could be expected to receive,
absent discrimination in their marketplace. 207 Third, each recipient was to
maximize the amount of the DBE goal that could be met by race-neutral means
and then seek approval from DOT of the resulting race-preferential and race-
neutral shares of DBE awards expected.20 8
201. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-37 (1995), with
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-516.
202. Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1106, 1113 (July 19, 1995) ("We should reaffirm the principle of affirmative action
and fix the practices. We should have a simple slogan: Mend it, but don't end it."); see also
Memorandum on Affirmative Action, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1114 (July 19, 1995) (informing heads of
executive departments and agencies that "[tihis Administration will continue to support
affirmative measures that promote opportunities ... for Americans subject to discrimination and
its continuing effects," and propounding policy principles for agencies to adhere to).
203. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424 § 105(t), 96 Stat.
2097 (1982).
204. SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 206.
205. See George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise Programs, GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 423, 439-40 (2007) [hereinafter La Noue,
Setting Goals].
206. Id. at 424.
207. Id. at 439-40.
208. Id. at 470-71.
2008]
1028 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 57:991
Considerable effort goes into creating annual goal-setting proposals. The
average length of annual goal proposals is about twenty pages, 9 but the
review of availability and utilization data can require many hours of work.
Most of the proposals are done in-house, although in a few cases consultants
are used. There is also a requirement that there be a period of public comment
on the goals proposed and sometimes various stakeholders (DBEs, non-DBEs,
and others) will submit comments. 210  There is some subsequent negotiation
about the goals before the proposals are sent off to federal review.
While the implementation of race-neutral programs in federal transportation
funding has drawn criticism,2 11 the process for setting local agency contracting
goals is well established in federal regulations, 212 and the outcomes of that
process are reasonably transparent. Perhaps it is predictable that in the
contracting field, where the landmark decisions date back to Croson (1989)
and Adarand (1996) and followed by many lower court decisions, 213 that the
209. For examples of annual goal proposals, see LAKE COUNTY FLA., DISADVANTAGED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE POLICY AND PROGRAM MANUAL (2008), available at http://
www.lakecountyfl.gov/documents/procedures/c-44_manual.pdf; SPOKANE TRANSIT AUTH.,
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (DBE) PROGRAM AND GOALS, FY 2008 (2007),
available at http://www.spokanetransit.com/aboutsta/documents/FinalDBEprogram2008.pdf,
PORTLAND INT'L JETPORT, DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PLAN (2007), available at
http://www.portlandjetport.org/document/DBEprogram07.pdf.
210. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097
(1982).
211. See generally La Noue, Setting Goals, supra note 205 (comprehensively reviewing goal-
setting issues).
212. See id at 443.
213. Post-Croson Courts have found serious flaws in the statistical evidence of
discrimination presented to them in relationship to goals set. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v.
District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[N]o 'strong basis in evidence' for the
use of a 35 percent goal .... ); Hershell Gill Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 333
F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2004) ("The statistical evidence presenting in the case is
unreliable and fails to establish the existence of discrimination."); L. Tarango Trucking v. County
of Contra Costa, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding faulty and dated census
data cannot be used to determine availability); Builder Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. County of Cook,
123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Il1. 2000) (finding county's statistical data unpersuasive in a
case where Dr. La Noue served as an expert witness), aff'd, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001); Ass'n
for Fairness in Bus., Inc. v. New Jersey, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353, 361 (D.N.J. 2000) ("Commission's
report offers little support for [MWBE program] .... "); Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F. Supp.
2d 1354, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (study does not provide a strong basis in evidence to justify
preferences), aff'd, 218 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir. 2000) (mem.); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio,
Inc. v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746-47 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (finding statistical disparities in
awarding of contracts, by itself, does not prove discrimination), aff'd, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir.
2000); Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. Watts, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 1998) ("The Record
at best establishes nothing more than some ill-defined wrong cause by some unidentified
wrongdoers; and, under City of Richmond, that is not enough!"); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S.
Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding county's
statistical evidence unpersuasive), aff'd, 122 F.3d 895 (11 th Cir. 1997); Contractors Ass'n of E.
Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 893 F. Supp. 419, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (city unable to provide
evidentiary basis for goals), aff'd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996). But see N. Contracting, Inc. v.
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rules for setting goals and seriously considering race-neutral alternatives
should be clearer than in higher education, because Gratz and Grutter were
decided in 2003. Nevertheless, the program evaluation process for goal-setting
and the search for race-neutral alternatives in contracting are still more
transparent than any process individual universities have publicly articulated
for considering race-conscious and race-neutral measures in their admissions
and financial aid.
D. Applying the Techniques of Program Evaluations to Achieving
Diversity in Higher Education
The first step in program evaluation is to precisely define the question to be
asked or the problem to be solved. In Croson, Justice O'Connor was clearer
regarding the requirements for using race in contracting than she was regarding
the requirements for using race in higher education in Grutter.214 Race can
only be a compelling interest in awarding contracts when it is a remedy for
previously identified discrimination, and only then can it be used in "the
extreme case,"' where "some form of narrowly tailored racial reference might
be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion.
In higher education, if an institution demonstrates that diversity is a part of
its institutional mission, it may have met some part of its compelling interest
burden. Presumably, discovery might show that, in a particular institution,
"diversity" is just a pretext for prohibited forms of racial politics or racial
balancing. But much future litigation will turn on the definition of diversity,
and which group-based identifiers are used to achieve it. It will be necessary
to measure how the university defined and achieved diversity, the frequency
and thoroughness of the review of the use of race, and, most importantly,
whether serious consideration was given to race-neutral alternatives.
1. Defining Diversity
In contemporary higher education, diversity has no universally accepted
216meaning. It is doubtful that in any admission class there would be two
students with identical family experiences, personalities, intellectual
orientations, interests, skills, particular aspirations, or other experiences.
Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding strong basis of evidence that disparities
existed); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 992 (10th Cir. 2003)
(finding that "Denver... established a compelling interest" and the plaintiff did not raise narrow
tailoring).
214. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (holding that
a city may use race as a factor in ridding a city of"a system of racial exclusion," in which the city
had been a "passive participant"), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding
that a law school may use race as a factor if necessary to achieve the school's desired
"diversity").
215. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
216. See PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 5-6 (2003), for a
discussion of the history of the concept of diversity and its various definitions.
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Diversity, however, is most often discussed in terms of group identifiers (such
as race, ethnicity, gender, geography, and financial aid status), for which that
institution reports statistics.
2. Problems of Group Selection
Just as affirmative action policy in contracting and employment has been
driven by the selection of the approved minority groups targeted by each
program, 217 academic diversity programs will be formulated to include some
minority groups but not others. Moreover, few would argue that religion is
insignificant in shaping the worldview of some students, but it is rarely a factor
reported as a diversity category in admission statistics. The age or generational
status of students may add to classroom discussion, but it is often ignored in
diversity considerations.
There is clear precedent for judicial review of the groups selected as
approved minority groups by governmental actors. Justice O'Connor's
attention to narrow-tailoring group classification problems218 established a
pattern of judicial inquiry into group contracting preferences among lower
courts, 219 but she was silent on the issue in Grutter. Justice Kennedy, however,
217. See George R. La Noue & John C. Sullivan, Presumptions for Preferences: The Small
Business Administrations' Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action, 6 J. POL'Y HIST.
439, 439-40 (1994) (examining the assumptions surrounding "affirmative action's sanctioned
minorities").
218. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506, where Justice O'Connor wrote tartly:
The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have
suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond suggests that
perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.
The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preferences strongly impugns the
city's claim of remedial motivation.
Summarizing, she wrote that "there is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond
construction industry." Id.
219. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 530 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("In
today's society, it constitutes far too gross an oversimplification to assume that every single
Negro, Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut potentially interested in
construction contracting currently suffers from the effects of past or present racial
discrimination."); id. at 535 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No economic, social, geographical, or
historical criteria are relevant for exclusion or inclusion[ of the preferred groups]."). See also W.
States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding the federal DBE category is overinclusive and local governments must first determine
prior discrimination against each of six separate groups); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Def.,
262 F.3d 1306, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Congress may not justify a racial preference that benefits
all minorities merely by identifying discrimination as to one racial group."); Builder Ass'n of
Greater Chi. v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A state or local government
that has discriminated just against blacks may not by way of remedy discriminate in favor of
blacks and Asian-Americans and women." (emphases added)); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson,
125 F.3d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (the list of favored minority groups is not "narrowly tailored to
remedy past discrimination, active or passive, by the State of California"); Eng'g Contractors
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noted that the Michigan Law School's Director of Admissions from 1979 to
1990 testified that the Law School "faculty members were 'breathtakingly
cynical' in deciding who would qualify as a member of underrepresented
minorities.' '22° In Bakke, Justice Powell specifically expressed skepticism
about the decisions made by the Davis Medical School because "[t]he
University is unable to explain its selection of only the four favored groups-
Negroes, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and Asians-for preferential
treatment. The inclusion of the last group is especially curious in light of the
substantial numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions
process."
221
Higher education institutions need to have a research-based policy about
which group identifiers will be considered important in making admissions
decisions. Simple replication of the traditional affirmative action categories
will be suspect. How groups are defined makes a big difference in fairness.
For instance, are Asian Americans one group or many when assessing
diversity? 222  Are Americans with Iranian or Finnish backgrounds from
different groups, or are they just part of the white conglomeration? Does it
depend on how many generations a family has been in the United States? Are
such rules applied uniformly to Finnish Americans and Mexican Americans?
Institutions also need to be clear about the difference between diversity and
under-representation. Persons from very small groups may always add
diversity (Native Americans, for example) even if they are not under-
Ass'n of S. Fla. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 928 (11th Cir. 1997) ("It is clear as
window glass that the County gave not the slightest consideration to any alternative to a Hispanic
affirmative action program. Awarding construction contracts based upon ethnicity is what the
County wanted to do, and all it considered doing, insofar as Hispanics were concerned.");
Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The state can if it
wants redistribute wealth in favor of the disadvantaged, but it cannot get out from under Croson
by pronouncing entire racial and ethnic groups to be disadvantaged."); Ass'n for Fairness in Bus.,
Inc. v. New Jersey, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353, 354, 362 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding statute permitting
contract preferences for a wide range of groups, including Hawaiians, not justified); In re
Sherbrooke Sodding Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1037 (D. Minn. 1998) ("[D]efendants have been
singularly unable to demonstrate the connection between those individuals upon whom DBE
status has been conferred by the Congress and the regulations, and any present or past
discrimination against the races or gender of those individuals.").
220. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at
382 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Respondents have never offered any race-specific arguments
explaining why significantly more individuals from one underrepresented minority group are
needed in order to achieve 'critical mass' or further student body diversity.").
221. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.45 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that
Michigan's law school used an admissions procedure similar to the one Justice Powell approved
in Bakke).
222. See Theodore Hsien Wang & Frank H. Wu, Beyond the Model Minority Myth, in THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 191, 196, 199-200 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (describing the
negative consequences of the Census Bureau's all-inclusive concept of Asian American given the
major differences among sub-groups in that category).
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represented, whereas on some campuses Hispanics are under-represented but
may have achieved a critical mass.
3. Measuring the Attainment of Diversity
Grutter instructs that while an institution may not use a quota or seek
proportional representation, it can seek a "critical mass" of diverse students.
223
Justice O'Connor provided no further guidance on that exceedingly nebulous
concept. The very difficulty of creating a rational approach to the "critical
mass" issue may be a major reason why so few institutions have either engaged
in careful evaluations of their use of race in admissions or released those
evaluations to the public.
Logically, because the goal is intellectual diversity, it does not make sense to
combine all racially and ethnically underrepresented students together to create
a "critical mass." African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native
Americans generally bring distinctive cultural backgrounds to a campus. But
by any definition, there will rarely be a "critical mass" of Native Americans on
a campus. Given the percentage of African Americans and Hispanics in the
overall population, there are great regional variations in the ease of assembling
a critical mass of students from those groups.
But when do a group of diverse applicants reach a critical mass? 224 A report
by science and engineering associations states candidly:
Critical mass is not capable of an exact definition and may differ
from school to school and field to field and over time. [Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)] departments
vary widely in terms of diversity, and diversity advancements in a
Biology Department at University X will have little or no impact on
the isolation that an underrepresented minority student may suffer in
the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the same school.225
The report concludes with this advice:
What constitutes a critical mass of students sustainable over
extended periods through successful retention and recruitment is
currently amorphous-and left intentionally so by the Supreme
Court. Gathering good data may go a long way to establishing what
that number, both in order of magnitude and the range of
possibilities, might look like.
226
223. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36.
224. In its joint brief for the Patterson respondents in Gratz v. Bollinger, the NAACP and the
ACLU wrote that a university would be justified in "facilitating admission of a group of minority
students sufficient to enable them to form community and social support networks," which would
"reduce the racial tensions on campus." Brief for the Patterson Respondents at 45, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516). The organizations offered no guidance about how
to measure these concepts and the Court did not appear to adopt them.
225. MALCOM ET AL., supra note 113, at 17.
226. Id. at 37.
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Gathering "good data" is certainly a part of program evaluation, but by what
criteria should the data be analyzed? The STEM educators suggested that a
critical mass is the number of underrepresented students necessary in living,
working, and classroom situations that allows each student to make individual
contributions without feeling isolated or intimidated into believing that the
227student must speak for the entire class of underrepresented students. The
difficulties in operationalizing that concept as a constitutional standard without
engaging in stereotypes are mind boggling. 228 Can smaller campuses give
more admissions weight to race than larger campuses? Does achieving a
"critical mass" mean that rural or small town campuses may accord more
weight to ethnic factors than campuses in large urban areas?
Clearly one size will not fit all here. Consider, for example, one campus that
has produced a large amount of relevant data regarding a race-neutral plan to
diversify. After the Hopwood decision,229 the Texas state legislature created
the Top 10 Percent Plan, which gave the right to any Texas high school
graduate in the top ten percent of his or her high school class to enroll in any
state university. 23  In part, that plan was intended to and did produce more
African American and Hispanic freshmen at the University of Texas at Austin
than would have been admitted by considering standardized test scores and
grade point averages alone.231 The Top 10 Percent Plan also increased the
diversity of Texas high schools that could get students admitted to the selective
state university campuses. 232 In addition to the state legislative response to
Hopwood, the Austin campus created a personal achievement index that
considered essays, leadership, extracurricular activities, awards, work
experience, school or community service, and special circumstances (such as
family socioeconomic status, single parent homes, language spoken at home,
family responsibilities, school socioeconomic status, and the relationship of the
227. Id.
228. Good teachers can create an environment in which all students feel free to speak, but
still there will be some who choose silence and others who are more voluble without any regard
to group identifiers.
229. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
230. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008).
231. In 1999 about 41% of all white admits from Texas high schools came from the Top 10
Percent Plan, while the comparable percentage for African Americans, Asian Americans, and
Hispanics was 55%. OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, IMPLEMENTATION AND
RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW REPORT 9 6 tbl.2a (2006) [hereinafter
TEXAS ADMISSIONS REPORT 9]. By 2004, the last year before "affirmative action" was added to
the University of Texas admissions process, the percentage of top 10% admits from Texas high
schools had grown for all groups. For whites, it was 62%, African Americans 77%, and
Hispanics 78%. Id.
232. For instance, there were 200 more Texas High Schools sending students to the
University of Texas at Austin campus in 2003 than in 1997. ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note
12.
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average SAT or ACT in the student's high school to the student's own test
scores).233
After Grutter, university officials in Texas were not satisfied with the racial
results of these admission reforms. The University of Texas at Austin
admissions office declared that "[b]eginning with the entering class of 2005,
race/ethnicity was added to the list of special circumstances." 234  This terse
sentence does not reveal how much weight the University gave to racial or
ethnic considerations. To further obscure matters, the number of students
affected positively or negatively by the reintroduction of affirmative action can
not be precisely estimated from available data. For example, in the last year
before the reintroduction of affirmative action, the 2004 full-time freshmen
class enrolled 3901 (57%) whites, 309 (5%) African Americans, and 1149
(17%) Hispanics. 235 The next year's "return to affirmative action" 2005 class
comprised 3838 (56%) whites, 351 (5%) African Americans, and 1244 (18%)
Hispanics. 236 How would a court respond to the assertion that the gain of 1%
for these minority students was necessary to achieve diversity on the Austin
campus, especially because the percentage gain under the race-neutral regime
had increased these minorities from 16% in 1997 to 23% in 2004?237
Likewise, how would a court respond to evidence that, among 2004 freshmen
233. TEXAS ADMISSIONS REPORT 9, supra note 231, at 2.
234. Id Motivation for this change is only hinted at in a press release from the University
quoting the provost and the director for admissions. The motivation appears to rely on two
distinct considerations: (1) the difference between the percentage the Austin campus admitted
students and the percentage of the state population for African Americans and Hispanics; and (2)
that the use of race "levels the playing field with the rest of the country." Press Release, Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, University's Admission Policy to Include Consideration of Race (Aug. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.utexas.edu/news/2003/08/28/nradmission/. The level playing field
argument reflects the discomfort the University of Texas felt because out-of-state competitors
were coming to Texas high schools to recruit and provide financial aid, sometimes on the basis of
race. Matthew Tresague, Texas'Diversity Lures College Recruiters, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 16,
2005, at BI.
235. TEXAS ADMISSIONS REPORT 9, supra note 231, at 6 tbl.l.
236. Id. The number of full-time freshmen increased by 116 from 2004 to 2005. See id The
percentage of freshman students from Texas high schools automatically admitted through the Top
10 Percent Plan has increased every year from 42% in 1996 to 71% in the 2006 class. Id. at 7
tbl.2b. The percentage growth in the number of automatic admits has caused some concern
among University of Texas officials who want to preserve more discretion, even though the top-
10 percent admits outperform (measured by GPAs and graduation rates) students admitted in
other ways. OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, PERFORMANCE BY ENTERING
FRESHMEN FROM TEXAS HIGH SCHOOLS BY TOP 10% STATUS 1999-2005 (2006), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/GPA-TopIO-longitudinal99-05.pdf. From
1996 to 2001, the average six-year graduation rate for white Top 10 Percent admits was 82.3%,
75% for blacks, and 69.8% for Hispanics. See OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW REPORT
10 (PART 2) 4-7 tbls.3-6 (2007), available at http://www.utexas.edu/studentadmissions/
research/HB588-Report10-part2.pdf. The comparable figures for non-Top 10% admits are 69.6%
for whites, 61.7% for blacks, and 60% for Hispanics. See id
237. TEXAS ADMISSIONS REPORT 9, supra note 231, at 6 tbl. 1.
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who were not automatically admitted because of the Top 10 Percent Plan, the
average white freshman SAT was 1267 and GPA 3.02, whereas the
comparable scores for African Americans were 1116 and 2.58, and for
Hispanics were 1189 and 2.81, and that the gap between whites and non-whites
grew slightly for the 2005 affirmative action affected class? 38  Would the
University be able to show any compelling educational benefits caused by the
reversion to affirmative action?
In addition to practical problems of assessing reforms after Grutter, social
science research remains inadequate to determine what constitutes tangible
education benefits. For example, only three of the fifty-nine amicus briefs
supporting race-based pupil assignments filed with the Supreme Court since
2000 discussed the concept of critical mass. 239 Most of the briefs address the
very limited social science research on problems of tokenism and stereotype
threats.240 The National Academy of Education analyzed the authorities cited
in amicus briefs supporting the use of race-conscious policies and concluded:
Although we think that these authorities, read together, are
insufficiently strong to support any firm percentage for creating a
critical mass, this research (and the research cited elsewhere in this
report) convincingly makes the case for the harms of racial isolation.
We cannot say, based on existing research, whether 15 percent is
sufficient to avoid the harms associated with racial isolation; nor can
we say whether a linear (or some other) relationship exists between
increased diversity and educational benefits as the percent moves
from 15 to 30 percent and beyond. Further research is necessary in
241this regard.
This seems to say that existing national research supporting a particular critical
mass metric would not pass the strict scrutiny test, because the Court would
not find the data sufficiently empirical to constitute a goal for either race-
conscious or race-neutral policies.
Furthermore, this research cannot be a substitute for program evaluation,
which would have to reflect each institution's specific needs. Some university
communities are much more racially polarized than others. Some contain only
two races, whereas others are multi-ethnic. Does the sense of racial isolation
among Native Americans or Hispanics change because of differences in the
percentage of African Americans or whites in a school?
238. Id. at 23-24 tbls.7i & j. Asian Americans averaged about 18% percent in these years,
and international students 2%. Id. at 5 tbl. la.
239. COMM. ON SOCIAL Sci. RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DIVERSITY IN SCH., NAT'L
ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 13 tbl.3, 33 (Robert L. Linn & Kevin G.
Welner, eds. 2007). The report, prepared by a distinguished group of social scientists, analyzes
the social science claims in all of the amicus briefs.
240. Id. at 34.
241. Id. at 35.
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E. Reviewing the Use of Race
A 2006 report by the College Board stated:
Ultimately, given the obligation to ensure that race- and ethnicity-
conscious measures are limited in both scope and time, higher
education officials should be able to define success with respect to
their goals, and to recognize when they've achieved it .... [T]hose
judgments should have a solid empirical foundation, with clear and
relevant supporting evidence.
242
Program evaluation requires that institutions demonstrate the link between a
program's characteristics and outcomes, and explain how that link works.
Depending on the definition of diversity adopted by a campus, there is a wide
range of race-neutral programs available.
Programs may be divided in two categories: pre- and post-enrollment.
Assembling an admissions class can be affected by outreach and marketing
strategies, alumni activities, high school and community partnerships, financial
aid strategies, and selection decisions. Most public attention has focused on
race-neutral selection policies that can range from class rank systems (as seen
in Texas, Florida, and California) to individualized admission procedures that
focus on considerations of family disadvantage or high school adequacy.
But pre-enrollment programming is not sufficient-for serious consideration
of race-neutral alternatives, institutions should also focus on what happens
after enrollment. Reviews of housing policies, campus organizations, invited
speakers and colloquia, cultural activities and performances, student leadership
development opportunities, study abroad programs and student exchanges, and
faculty mentorship roles may all yield far more in the way of meaningful
educational diversity than the headcounts announced in admission statistics.
Finally, institutions should monitor the academic performance of diverse
students in terms of progress toward a degree, graduation, and job placement.
If some segment of the enrollment is falling substantially behind in these
categories, then adjustments may need to be made in selection criteria,
financial aid, or guidance. Admitting diverse students and letting them
flounder is not an acceptable result at institutions of higher education.
Changes in an institution's diversity may or may not have anything to do
with institutional race-preferential initiatives. In many states, the percentage of
white high school graduates is declining,243 and as a result, institutions whose
admissions pools are from those states may become more diverse without any
special programs. Other institutional changes can be made, such as developing
new majors, changing program locations, or the times for offering courses may
influence diversity, even though these actions are not at all race-conscious or
242. COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 12.
243. See Higher Education Landscape, http://professionals.collegeboard.com/data-reports-
research/trends/higher-ed-landscape (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (noting current demographic
trends in high school graduates).
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preferential. One wonders what the Justices who decided Parents Involved
would have thought if they had read that, a few days after the Court issued its
decision, Seattle announced that the Court's decision would not substantially
affect the school district's assignment program. By the time of the decision,
Seattle had suspended its race-based assignment program for several years and
was obtaining diversity by placing "International Baccalaureate and dual-
language programs in locations where they are likely to draw a diverse student
body. , 44 Further, Richard Kahlenberg's impressive new research shows that
by using economic status as a way to create racially diverse schools, benefits
can accrue to less affluent students without undermining the performance of
middle class students.
245
Institutions should be able to demonstrate clearly not only that the use of
race is necessary to justify a program's outcome, but also which aspect of the
program, among the array of its initiatives, is causing the desired effect. They
should be able to explain how that effect is caused, and to show that it could
not be created by implementing a race-neutral program in its place. In all
institutions of higher education, particular programs develop advocates among
administrators and beneficiaries, which may cause those programs to last long
after their need has expired or when other alternatives may achieve the goals as
well or better. Rigorous, ongoing program evaluation is a method for avoiding
this kind of programmatic obsolescence.
The fundamental requirement of transparency is increasingly recognized as a
precondition of effective educational evaluation. For example, the current draft
revision of the canonical Joint Committee Standards provides that
"[e]valuations should make complete descriptions of findings, limitations, and
any resulting conclusions available to all stakeholders, unless doing so would
violate legal and propriety obligations. 246  Often, the credibility of an
evaluation process depends on its transparency. A recent working paper by the
National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges
(NASULGC) and the American Association of State Universities and Colleges
(AASUC) asked the following question: Why, since "every NASULGC and
AASUC member generates at considerable expense enormous amounts of
accountability information for their own needs, for the needs of specialized and
regional accreditation agencies, for governing boards, for state and federal
legislatures and agencies, for granting agencies, etc.," was there so much
244. Tamar Lewin, Across U.S., a New Look at School Integration Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2007, at A25.
245. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION 5-
7 (Century Found. 2007), available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/districtprofiles.
pdf.
246. Joint Comm. on Standards for Educational Evaluation, Program Evaluation Standards 1
(3d drft. Oct. 2007), available at http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/jc/ProgramEvaluationStandard
StatementsOct2007(3).pdf [hereinafter Program Evaluation Standards Draft].
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dissatisfaction about accountability in higher education? 247  The paper
provided two answers. First, the information produced did not create the
possibility of inter-institutional comparisons and second, the data for some or
all of the accountability measures are only partially made public. 248 The paper
concluded: "All of our accountability measures should be transparent. By that
we mean that both the methods by which they are derived and the results of• • ,,249
those measures should be publicly disclosed.
Regarding preferential admissions, a report published by the Institute for
Effective Governance concluded that
without transparency in admissions policies, the delicate
constitutional balance between ends and means may not be
maintained. Without transparency, institutions will not be able to
conduct appropriate internal debates, will not be able to adjust their
policies from year to year, will not be able to defend their policies
publicly, and will not be able to avoid expensive and bitterly
contentious litigation.25°
The admissions office at the University of Texas at Austin has developed a
model of transparency in evaluating the statewide race-neutral Top 10 Percent
plan. That office has continually monitored this plan. In introducing a thirty-
six-page report, its website states:
This is the ninth in a series of reports on the demographic makeup
[and academic achievement] of Top 10% students entering The
University of Texas at Austin. These reports were developed to
provide easy access to understandable data for the press, the general
public, policy analysts, political decision-makers, and fellow
academicians. 
51
But while this kind of intensive periodic evaluation has been utilized for a
race-neutral program, universities have not been willing to evaluate publicly
their race-conscious programs, nor demonstrate that they have seriously
247. McPherson & Shulenburger, supra note 195, at 5.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 3.
250. GEORGE R. LA NOUE, DIVERSITY IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: ISSUES FOR TRUSTEES 19
(Inst. for Effective Governance Mar. 2005), available at https://www.goacta.org/publications/
downloads/DiversityinCollegeAdmissions.pdf.; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN
AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 196-97 (2003) (arguing that the various
constituencies with stakes in an institution need information about its racial preferences to hold it
accountable). Lani Guinier makes a different point by arguing that institutions lacking in
transparency make use of obscure criteria to reproduce a comfortable elite legitimized by adding
a critical mass of people of color. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians
at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 195-96 (2003). Ayres and
Foster argue that a lack of transparency is undemocratic because it deprives citizens of the
information needed to judge policies and invites arbitrary decisions and maybe invidious criteria.
Ayres & Foster, supra note 114, at 64-65.
251. TEXAS ADMISSIONS REPORT 9, supra note 231, at 1.
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considered race-neutral alternatives.252 Looking toward future litigation, Ayres
and Foster are clear that:
In order for a court to conduct a necessary minimum preference
inquiry, it must have available to it data on the overall and marginal
costs and benefits of the affirmative action program at issue. We
think that universities should be required to produce these data in
order for their admissions programs to pass strict scrutiny. After all,
courts cannot conduct the minimum necessary preference and
differentiation inquires without these data, and universities should be
considering these data as they design their programs, so it makes
sense to place the burden on them to produce these data. Of course,
parties challenging university policies would also be free to produce
their own data, and the adversarial system can sort out which data to
credit.
253
Some of that minimum necessary preference inquiry should examine race-
neutral alternatives, but the STEM educators' admonition to "leave a paper
trail of this [race-neutral alternative] examination" 254 has largely gone
unheeded.
F. The Process of Seriously Considering Race-Neutral Alternatives
Serious consideration should require that institutions ask and answer each of
the program evaluation questions discussed earlier, but this still leaves the
question: "Who should participate in the evaluation process?" Evaluations of
race-neutral alternatives as a path to achieve diversity involve educational as
well as political and legal questions, so no single campus office will be a
sufficient policy source. Admissions officers have the specific information to
analyze some of the educational questions involved, but their role is to
implement institutional polices, not to make them. Faculty may have
evaluative skills that might involve surveys, control groups, and even
regression analysis, but in most universities they are not well-informed about
undergraduate admissions policies, and do not play an active role in making
these labor-intensive decisions. Because constitutional issues are always
inherent in these considerations and political issues are sometimes involved,
252. Of course, it could be argued that there is rarely much transparency in the admissions
process at selective institutions about any matter. Peter Schmidt summarizes Jerome Karabal's
findings about the admissions process at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton during the era when each
tried to hold down the number of Jewish students as a "categorical rejection of the idea that
admission should be based on academic criteria alone" in order that decisions could proceed with
"discretion and opacity-discretion so that the gatekeepers would be free to do what they wished
and opacity so that how they used their discretion would not be subject to public scrutiny."
PETER SCHMIDT, COLOR AND MONEY: How RICH WHITE KIDS ARE WINNING THE WAR OVER
COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 22-23 (2007) [hereinafter SCHMIDT, COLOR AND MONEY]
(internal quotation marks omitted).
253. Ayres & Foster, supra note 114, at 83.
254. MALCOM ETAL., supra note 113, at 19.
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the process and outcome of race-neutral consideration should be presented to
campus governing bodies, culminating in review by the university's Board of
Regents or Trustees. They should draw upon the assistance of the institution's
general counsel, and the state Attorney General's office if they are a public
institution. Importantly, schools must provide transparency, because secrecy
undermines credibility. Multilayered review is more likely to be transparent,
and this could help convince a court that the school performed race-neutral
evaluations with the requisite constitutional serious consideration.
VI. CONCLUSION
The requirement that universities seriously consider race-neutral alternatives
before resorting to racially preferential policies is an important, if little
understood, legacy of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's affirmative action
jurisprudence. Given the prominence of the requirement in a series of
Supreme Court cases, its continuing vitality is apparent in cases as recent as
Parents Involved and its rigorous application by OCR, universities' affirmative
action programs are at peril if they fail to conduct rigorous, research-based
evaluations of workable potential race-neutral programs before resorting to, or
continuing to employ, race-conscious policies, such as the use of race as a
factor in student admissions or financial aid.
Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence establishes that rigorous, research-based
studies are not merely a sound characteristic of affirmative action policy
formation and program evaluation, but a constitutionally required element of
equal protection. The precise contours of this requirement have not been
spelled out by the Court. We know that institutions must seriously, and in
good faith, review available, workable alternatives, which may satisfy the
institution's compelling, multi-factored diversity interests. This requirement
can be understood best in light of various regulatory guidance, professional
assessments, and the academic literature of program evaluation. In general, a
university's serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives, if it is to pass
constitutional muster, must meet stringent standards of rigorous, research-
based evaluation, such as the following:
" The development and articulation of formal "policy,
procedures, and statistical standards for evaluating race-
neutral alternatives;
255
* Identification and evaluation of an array of potential race-
neutral policies, as opposed to only one or two;
256
255. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi.
256. Id. at xi (citing INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES, supra note 4); see also PROGRAM EVALUATION
STANDARDS SUMMARY, supra note 184 (requiring that educational evaluations should be
complete and fair).
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* Articulation of underlying facts that will demonstrate the
feasibility of particular race-neutral policies;
257
* Empirical data-collection and data-analysis as the predicate
of research findings;
258
" Reliance upon "current, competent and comprehensive
data";
259
* Measurement against established benchmarks and
standards;
260
* Formal written documentation of evaluative processes,
empirical foundations, and the whole range of race-neutral
programs evaluated but not adopted, including research
studies that include projections about likely results over
time;
26 1
* Periodic review to determine whether changing
circumstances or newly emergent program alternatives have
altered the necessity or feasibility of current policies;
262
* Data analysis to establish causal relationships properly;
263
" Transparency throughout the evaluative process;
264
* Communicative strategies to ensure that newly emergent
programs as developed by peer institutions are efficiently
identified and promptly evaluated.265
These practices are well-established in the evaluation literature and,
collectively, constitute what it means for a prospective policy to be seriously
considered.
257. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi (citing INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES,
supra note 4).
258. Id. (citing INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES, supra note 4).
259. Id. (citing INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES, supra note 4); see also PROGRAM EVALUATION
STANDARDS SUMMARY, supra note 184 (directing that information gathering procedures should
assure valid data and that information gather procedures ensure data that is reliable for its
intended purpose).
260. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi.
261. COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 53; Arthur L. Coleman & Scott R. Palmer, A
More Circuitous Path to Racial Diversity, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 13, 2007,
at B 10; see also PROGRAM EVALUATION STANDARDS SUMMARY, supra note 184 (directing that
the identified program should be documented clearly and accurately).
262. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi (citing INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES,
supra note 4); COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 2, at 53.
263. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi (citing INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES,
supra note 4).
264. See PROGRAM EVALUATION STANDARDS SUMMARY, supra note 184 (directing that the
full set of evaluation findings and pertinent limitations be disclosed to persons affected by the
evaluation); Program Evaluation Standards Draft, supra note 246.
265. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at xi.
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
This Article has discussed in some detail the legal obligation of higher
education institutions to seriously consider race-neutral alternatives before
using race in any preferential manner. It has established that these institutions
regularly engage in program evaluation about a variety of other educational
issues. It has described the process of program evaluation regarding setting
goals in federal transportation contracting where race-neutral alternatives are
maximized. It has portrayed in some detail how program evaluation steps
might be applied to the problem of considering race-neutral alternatives in
higher education. Finally, it has reported that visible examples of higher
education institutions fulfilling this legal requirement are almost non-existent.
The failure of some institutions to engage in this kind of rigorous public
evaluation should not prevent others from making assessments about the use of
race-preferential or race-neutral approaches in higher education. A consortium
of twenty professors and ten graduate students has been formed to collect and
analyze data on the question of how students who receive admissions
preferences perform while in school and afterward.266 One startling piece of
data has already been pried loose. According to Richard Sander, from 2004 to
2006, black graduates from the University of Michigan Law School failed state
bar examinations on the first try about eight times more often than white
graduates of that law school.267 If this problem had been known before the
Grutter decision, its effect on public opinion, and maybe on some Justices,
might have been considerable.
26
Recently, there has been an outpouring of books critical of university
admissions processes, 269 which paints a picture that makes the Grutter Court's
266. Peter Schmidt, Scholars Mount Sweeping Effort to Measure Effects of Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 18, 2008, at A19.
267. Id. Ayres and Foster calculate that 82% of the minorities admitted between 1995 and
2000 to the University Michigan law school benefited from preferences. Ayres & Foster, supra
note 114, at21 n.51.
268. Of course, Professor Sander's landmark research arguing that law school preferential
admissions harmed African American students was published a year after Gratz and Grutter were
decided. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
269. See, e.g., JOHN AUBREY DOUGLASS, THE CONDITIONS FOR ADMISSION: ACCESS,
EQUITY, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 6, 237-41 (2007) (describing
how admission standards as institutions affect "contemporary debates over affirmative action");
JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT
HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 543-44 (2005) (noting that Grutter "was a tremendous
victory for the elite universities" and gave "a partial, quite sanitized description of the selection
process"); PETER SACKS, TEARING DOWN THE GATES: CONFRONTING THE CLASS DIVIDE IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 1-3 (2007) (describing the book's argument for why the education
system bolsters class stratification); SCHMIDT, COLOR AND MONEY, supra note 252, at 29-34
(describing the different stakeholders that educational institutions mollify through admissions);
JOSEPH A. SOARES, THE POWER OF PRIVILEGE: YALE AND AMERICA'S ELITE COLLEGES 2-4
(2007) (noting that, while minorities and legacies receive benefits in admissions, "[n]either ...
receive the preferential treatment given to athletes in top-tier admissions"); MITCHELL L.
STEVENS, CREATING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE EDUCATION OF ELITES 186
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willingness to defer to university judgments seem naive. Admissions is a high-
stakes decision, fulfilling or deflating years of preparation and hope for a
family. Because there are always more rejections than acceptances at
competitive institutions, increased scrutiny can be expected. Research shows
family wealth and educational background can be decisive advantages in
admission, and that social or political connections play a role as well.2 But
when race and ethnicity are factors, they raise constitutional questions in ways
other characteristics do not. Families clutching rejection letters will not be
reassured by Peter Schmidt's conclusion:
Unable to come up with solid evidence to back its claims that
affirmative action yielded educational benefits, the higher education
establishment settled on an alternative plan: It would make such
assertions anyway, and use spin, exaggeration, and a false sense of
certainty in its assertions to pull the wool over the justices' eyes.
27 1
Schmidt is an insider with unparalleled access to the higher education
establishment, 2 72 but his suspicions have also been felt by the broader public
even before the onslaught of these new publications. There is substantial
public skepticism about whether higher education institutions have been candid
about their use of racial preferences. Constitutional initiatives banning racial
preferences were proposed for five more states (Arizona, Colorado, Missouri,
Nebraska, and Oklahoma) in the 2008 election. 27 3  Transparent program
evaluations of the use of race and race-neutral alternatives may be necessary if
higher education institutions are to avoid further loss of public confidence and
rejection at the polls.
Finally, it is inevitable that there will be another case testing the limits of the
use of racial classifications in education. A key factor in Justice Kennedy's
Parents Involved vote striking down Jefferson County's race-based pupil
assignment program was the County's inability to articulate the criteria it used
274and how its plan was implemented. Such defects are rife in college
(2007) ("[I]ndividualized consideration creates peculiar and heretofore unacknowledged forms of
class bias in selective college admissions."); see also Gary M. Lavergne, College Admissions as
Conspiracy Theory, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 9, 2007, at BI0 (addressing the
basic arguments and criticisms of Douglass, Schmidt, Soares, and Sacks).
270. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & STEPHEN J. ROSE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS,
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admission decisions as well. Justice Kennedy concluded that "[w]hen a court
subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities
in favor of the State. ' 75 Whether the defendant institution has engaged in the
kind of program evaluation that has seriously considered race-neutral
alternatives to achieving diversity may well be decisive in the future litigation
and OCR investigations.
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